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Vaughan Black* The Strange Cases of Alberta's
Guarantees Acknowledgement Act
A Study in Choice-of-Law Method
I. Introduction
Fifty years ago John Willis wrote Two Approaches to the Conflict of
Laws: A Comparative Study of the English Law and the Restatement of
the American Law Institute.I There he described two different - perhaps
even opposed - conceptions of the problem posed by cases involving
geographically complex facts. It is a goal of this article to assess the status
and the vices and virtues of those two approaches in Canada today. Such
a task is not a mere updating of Willis' piece, though that alone might be
a useful exercise. In the first place, Willis' analysis takes place largely at
the level of conflict-of-laws theory. He is concerned with the way in
which one's understanding of the jurisprudential nature of conflict of laws
affects one's approach. Of such matters there is virtually no discussion in
Canadian courts today. For instance, argument over whether a Canadian
conflict of laws is based on a vested rights theory or a local law theory
rarely occurs today in either courtroom or classroom. But the disputes
over theory of the 1930s are now reflected in disputes over judicial
methodology: What facts are relevant to a choice-of-law decision? What
questions should be asked and in what order? What sort of arguments
can be made and what authorities should be appealed to? In addition to
analyzing the state of Willis' two approaches today I want to comment
on why the terms of the debate between those approaches have become
so predictable.
First, however, it will be necessary to describe the two approaches, and
Willis' words are still a good starting point.
There are two ways in which a court might approach the decision of cases
involving a foreign element. This is a practical problem, it might say, to be
solved in a practical way. What is the interest for which protection is
claimed? Is it such that the wishes of a community, whether foreign
community or our community, as expressed in some law, should be
treated as paramount over the wishes of the parties before us?2
*Of the Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University. Visiting Scholar, U.C.L.A. School of Law,
1986-87. My thanks to Alastair Bissett-Johnson, Robert Sedler, David Fraser and Susannah
Rowley for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1. (1936), 14 Can. Bar Rev. 1.
2. Id, at 1.
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In Willis' eyes, this "practical" approach - or, as he later dubbed it, "the
approach of justice and convenience ' 3 - attempted, in a direct and
explicit fashion, to take account of such matters as fairness and hardship.
A court employing it could inquire directly into the interests of the
competing communities involved and the fairness and hardship of the
competing resolutions of the dispute before it. The current embodiment
of this "practical" approach, at least in the area of choice-of-law
methodology, is found in the so-called "modem approaches" familiar to
students of American conflicts law. I prefer to group these methodologies
under the label of "the interpretive approach", for, as I and others have
argued elsewhere, they have a long though sometimes forgotten history
that makes the term "modem approach" inappropriate.4 The term
"interpretive approach" also has the advantage of describing what courts
employing this choice-of-law approach are called upon to do. They must
inquire into the purposes of the competing legal rules and, by employing
techniques of legal interpretation, decide which of those rules should be
construed so as to apply in the territorially complex case before them.
They must take account of the content of competing legislative or
common law rules and construe them in a fashion that is not essentially
different from that which they use to construe laws in a purely domestic
setting.
Willis dubbed the second approach "conceptual":
The other possible approach is not practical but conceptual - the
deduction of consistent rules from a consistent legal theory of the "nature"
of the conflict of laws. When a given system of law deduces the answer to
the question whether an English branch of a dissolved Russian bank can
be sued in England from the "nature" of a branch of a foreign corporation,
or solves the problem of whether there is a good marriage between A and
B, whose French domiciliary law requires the consent of their parents for
a valid marriage, when that marriage is celebrated in England where no
such consents are required, by determining whether consent of parents
goes to form or capacity, its approach is conceptual.5
In current choice-of-law methodology the conceptual approach is
represented by the "jurisdiction-selecting" 6 method. Courts employing
such a method to determine the governing law are required to take the
following steps. First the dispute is "characterized" under a certain legal
3. Id, at 4.
4. See Black, "One if by land, Two if by Sea: Old Directions in Maritime Law", in New
Directions in Maritime Law 1984, D. Sharpe and W. Spicer (eds.) (Toronto: Carswell, 1985)
at 26-32 and Horowitz, Choice-of-law Decisions Involving Slavery: Interest Analysis in the
Early Nineteenth Century (1970), 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 587.
5. Willis, supra, note 1,at2.
6. David Cavers-invented this term. See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem
(1933), 47 Harv. L. Rev. 173 at 193.
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label. That is, the court decides whether the case before it should be
classified as a torts case, a trusts case, a family matter or one of the other
accepted classifications. Next, the choice-of-law rule appropriate to that
class of case is selected and applied. This application generally involves
the finding of several connecting factors - links between various
jurisdictions and those facts which are deemed by the choice-of-law rule
to be significant - and then the application of the rule which states that
certain factors or combinations of factors indicate that the law of a given
jurisdiction should apply. In theory it is only once this process is complete
that the court learns the content of the competing laws, and at this stage
the only law that is relevant is that of the jurisdiction which has been
selected by the application of the choice-of-law rule.
Each of these two methodologies has its group of adherents and in the
days since Willis wrote much ink has been spilled in arguments between
those camps. In the United States the jurisdiction-selecting approach
embodied in the First Restatement 7 came under a concerted analytical
attack by those who favoured taking content into account in some
explicit fashion. 8 Following some interesting skirmishes the interpretivist
camp more or less won the day. Though most American courts now
espouse some variety of interpretive approach to choice-of-law problems9
there has in recent years been something of a counter-revolution in the
law reviews.10 This challenge to protract the battle has been accepted by
those in the interpretivist camp. 1 In this country, however, the
jurisdiction-selecting approach still holds sway in most courts and most
law reviews, though some attempt has been made to counter it, notably
by Professor John Swan.12
7. Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws, (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1934).
8. The principal attacks on the old order were Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the
Conflict of Laws (1924), 33 Yale L.J. 736; Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict
of Laws (1924); Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws (1928), 37 Yale L.J.
468; Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem (1933), 47 Harv. L. Rev. 173; and the
essays of Brainerd Currie which eventually came to be collected in his Selected Essays on the
Conflict ofLaws, (Durham: Duke Univ: Press, 1963).
9. See Weintraub, The Future of Choice of Law For Torts: What Principles Should Be
Preferred? (1977), 41 No. 2 Law & Contemp. Probs. 146 at 146, note 1 for documentation
of the fact that over half of the American State Courts have rejected the traditional choice-of-
law rule for torts.
10. For examples of American scholars attacking choice-of-law methods which take explicit
account of the purposes of the competing laws, see Twerski, Neumeier v. Kuehner Where Are
the Emperor's Clothes? (1973), 1 Hofstta LJ. 104; Brtlmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth
of Legislative Intent (1980), 78 Mich. L. Rev. 393, Kom, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A
Critique (1983), 83 Col. L. Rev. 722; Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of InterestAnalysis
(1984), 32 Am. J. Comp. L. 1; and Brilmayer, Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws:
A Challenge (1984), 35 Mercer L. Rev. 555.
11. See, eg., Kay, Review Essay (1985), 73 Cal. L. Rev. 525.
12. Swan, Tort Liability in the Conflict ofLaws: The Case For and Outline ofa New Approach
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One limitation of much of the scholarship on both sides of the battle
lines has been its abstract character - its tendency to talk in theoretical
terms unsupported by examples. At best this is ameliorated by using one
or two examples and then asserting that they are representative. The
problem with this style of debate is that it is bound to be inconclusive.
Any method is bound to have its defects and it has always been easy for
the proponents of one view to seize on a questionable judicial decision
which employed the opponents' method and then write a comment
which not only criticizes that case but purports as well to refute the
opposing method once and for all. A remarkable proportion of the
scholarship in this area has taken the form of extended comments on
single cases. More than once a single decision has been the cause of a
whole scholarly symposium. 13 Supposedly questionable decisions
employing some variety of the interpretive approach have been the
occasion for multiple attacks from the jurisdiction-selecting camp. One
can emerge from all of this with the feeling that, in spite of the fact that
each faction appears able to point to apparently devastating examples of
the flaws in its opponent's views, neither side has really proven much.
After all, nobody is perfect. We can all have an off day. But one or two
bad cases are no reason for giving up on a more general method,
especially when there are equivalent examples of failure on the other
side.14
Here I want to attempt a slightly more systematic approach: the
examination of all of the reported conflicts cases under a given statute.
This somewhat expanded sample might have the advantage of rendering
an argument for a choice-of-law method somewhat more convincing
than does the examination of one or two eases. As an opponent of the
traditional jurisdiction-selecting approach and a firm adherent to the
belief that the only acceptable approach to a choice-of-law case is one
(1967), 3 U.B.C.L Rev. 185; and Swan, Annual Survey of Conflict of Laws (1976), 8 Ottawa
L. Rev. 182.
13. Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws (1963), 63
Colum. L. Rev. 1212; Symposium: Comments on Reich v. Purcell (1968), 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
551 (1968); Symposium on Cipolla v. Shaposka - An Application of "7nterest Analysis"
(1971) 9 Duq. L. Rev. 347; Symposium on Foster v. Leggett (1972), 61 Ky. LJ. 367;
Symposium: Neumeier v. Kuehner: A Conflicts Conflict (1973), 1 Hofstra L. Rev. 93;
Comments on The Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co. (1973), 6 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 363;
Conflict of Laws Symposium (1973), 25 S.C.L. Rev. 169; Symposium: Choice-of-Law Theory
After Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague (1981), 10 Hofstra L. Rev. 1; Symposium: Choice of
Law (1981), 14 V.C. Davis L. Rev. 841.
14. For examples of two exceptions to this observation, one in favour of a modem,
interpretive approach and the other critical of (or at least unimpressed by) such approaches, see
Sedler, Choice of Law in Michigan: A 7une to go Modern (1978), 24 Wayne L. Rev. 829; and
Corr, Modern Choice of Law and Public Policy: The Emperor Has The Same Old Clothes
(1985), 39 U. Miami L. Rev. 647.
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that includes an overt examination of the content and policies of the
competing laws, I think that the advantage of looking at a series of
judicial decisions makes the case for an interpretive approach much more
strongly.
11. The Guarantees Acknowledgement Act
The Statute I have in mind is Alberta's Guarantees Acknowledgement
Act. 15 It has the advantage of being a relatively brief and straightforward
piece of legislation which has received considerable judicial treatment in
non-conflicts cases and has also given rise to a varied but manageable
number of choice-of-law cases over the last 15 years. Like most statutes
it contains no express conflict-of-laws provisions, thus leaving the
question of its territorial scope entirely up to the courts.
The G.A.A. is a short (seven sections) and simple enough statute, the
general purpose of which would be no great mystery to most lawyers.
The Act requires personal guarantors16 of certain kinds of principal
debts17 to attend before a notary public, acknowledge that they have
executed the guarantee in question and submit to an examination by the
notary. If the notary is convinced the guarantor is aware of the contents
of the guarantee and understands it, he or she issues and signs a certificate
to that effect. The notary is also required to have the guarantor sign the
certificate, acknowledging that he or she is the person named in it. The
certificate is then required to be attached to the guarantee. The Act
provides that no guarantee has any effect unless the guarantor appears
before the notary and makes the required acknowledgement.
The G.A.A. thus supplements the normal Statute of Frauds
requirements for formal validity of guarantees. Presumably it has a
comparable principal purpose, namely, in the phrase usually associated
with the Statute of Frauds, the prevention of certain fraudulent practices.
The Act does not go so far as to require potential guarantors to obtain
independent legal advice but it goes some way to ensure that they
contract with some measure of informed consent. Although the G.A.A.
contains no express choice-of-law provisions it does have one sub-section
which at least contemplates the existence of other jurisdictions outside
Alberta. Its definition of "notary public" is as follows:
2 In this Act,
(b) "notary public" means,
15. R.S.A. 1980, c. G-12. Hereafter, the G.A.A.
16. Corporate guarantors are excluded: Id, s. 2(a).
17. Guarantees of contracts for the sale of goods or of interests in land are excluded: Id, s.
1(a)(ii).
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(i) with reference to an acknowledgement made in Alberta, a
notary public in and for Alberta, and
(ii) with reference to an acknowledgement made in a jurisdiction
outside Alberta, a notary public in and for that jurisdiction.18
This definition appears to assume that there will be times when the Act
will apply to certificates completed in other provinces or countries. And
since it provides for the making of the mandated acknowledgement in
other jurisdictions it may be reasonable to assume that it contemplates its
application to the execution of guarantees in those jurisdictions.
A noteworthy feature of the G.A.A. is that since its passage in 1939 it
has been amended seven times.19 Though none of these amendments
represents a substantial departure from the thrust of the Act, they do
indicate that the legislature has not been content merely to pass the Act
and then forget about it; rather, presumably in response to the usual
inputs into the legislative process (lobby groups, reports by government
counsel regarding the statute's treatment in the courts), the legislature has
been prepared to tinker with the G.A.A. to remedy perceived defects. In
addition, two reports of Alberta's Institute of Law Research and Reform
have considered the G.A.A., 20 and, as the following passage from a
decision of Alberta's Court of Queen's Bench shows, such reports do not
go unnoticed by courts.
This legislation is unique to Alberta and is not to be found in any other
province of Canada. Several years ago the legislation was considered in
detail by the Law Research and Reform Commission of this province.
The report of that body was that on balance the legislation did have
value and should be retained. It has no doubt been used in many instances
by guarantors to avoid their obligations to creditors; and creditors, in
particular out-of-province creditors who have not seen fit to obtain advice
of Alberta counsel, have learned to their dismay that their guarantees are
unenforceable in Alberta.2'
18. This was added by S.A. 1968, c. 36, s. 2.
19. The G.A.A. was first enacted by S.A. 1939, c. 74. There are no available legislative
debates on it, and the legislative record reveals it made the passage from first reading to assent
in a week. Since then it has been tinkered with in S.A. 1940, c. 25; S.A. 1947, c. 45; S.A. 1953,
c. 49; S.A. 1967, c. 26; S.A. 1968, c. 36; S.A. 1969, c. 41; and S.A. 1970, c. 51. On March
10, 1987 Bill 230 was introduced in the Alberta Legislative Assembly proposing further
amendments to the G.A.A. but this Private Member's Bill died on the order paper.
20. Institute of Law Research and Reform, Report No. 5, Guarantees Acknowledgment Act
(1970) and Report No. 44, The Statute of Frauds and Related Legislation (1985). Thus far
there has been no legislative response to the 1970 Report (although its first recommendation
- that the G.A.A. be retained - had been complied with).
21. C.LB.C. v. Country Lane Furniture Warehouse (Wataskiwin) Ltd et aL (1981), 15 Alta.
L.R. (2d) 127 at 128. For an example of a judicial reference to the 1985 Report see First
Investors Corp. Ltd v. Mehra et aL (1986), 71 A.R. 140 (Q.B., Master).
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The passage is interesting because, although the case in which it appeared
presented no conflict-of-laws issue, the court singled that area out as one
of special significance. As we shall see directly, conflict-of-laws cases
under the G.A.A. have raised difficult problems. Although judges have
encountered difficult questions in conflicts cases under the G.A.A., and
have said so explicitly, there has been virtually no response from other
institutions with a law reform mandate. Neither of the two reports of the
Institute of Law Research and Reform makes mention of the conflicts
issues which might arise, and in some cases have arisen, under the statute.
Nor have legislative amendments been made in response to conflict-of-
laws issues. The only conceivable exception here is the definition of
"notary public" mentioned at note 18. This judicial monologue on the
conflicts issues stands in sharp contrast to the relatively vigourous
discussion and amendment of other aspects of the G.A.A.
Before turning to an examination of the conflicts jurisprudence under
the G.A.A. I want to make an observation about the non-conflicts cases
that have been decided under it. It is my impression that courts in those
non-conflicts cases have not been particularly hostile to the Act. They
have not endeavoured to interpret it out of existence or otherwise
frustrate its general thrust. Nor, on the other hand, have they been
inclined to extend the statute into areas where one might not expect it to
go. There have been the expected disputes about whether a given
agreement is in fact within that statute - for example, is the agreement
in question a guarantee or is it an indemnity?22 Or, if it is a guarantee, is
the underlying principal contract one for the sale of goods (in which case
the Act does not apply) or for the provision of services (in which case it
does)?23 Other cases have focussed on the statute's breadth of coverage.
Does it bind the Crown?24 Should a mere clerical non-compliance - for
example the failure to fill in the date on the Notary's Certificate - void
the guarantee? And if courts would be prepared to excuse a mere
technical non-compliance (as they in fact have been) then how much
22. Crown Lumber Ltd v. Engel et at (1961), 36 W.W.R. 28 D.L.R. (2d) 762 (Alta. S.C.,
App. Div.).
23. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. of Canada Ltd v. Knight et at (1960), 33 W.W.R. 287
(Alta. S.C., App. Div.) ;Crown LumberLtd v. Engel et at (1961), 36 W.W.R. 128; 28 D.L.R.
(2d) 762 (Alta. S.C., App. Div.); Canadian Acceptance Corp. Ltd v. Evanson et at, [197111
W.W.R. 457 (Alta. S.C., T.D.); Ampex of Canada Ltd v. Thomson etat (1979), 11 Alta. L.R.
(2d) 303 (Q.B.); Robert Simpson Co. Ltd. v. Balalaika Restaurants Ltd. et a. (1980), 12 Ata.
L.R. (2d) 41, 109 D.L.R. (3d) 520; 27 A.R. 344 (Q.B.); Keillian West Ltd v. Sportspage
Enterprises Ltd et at (1982), 23 Alta. L.R. (2d) 99; 40 A.R. 586 (Q.B.); and Westeel-Rosco
Ltd v. Edmonton Tinsmith Supplies Ltd et at (1985), 68 A.R- 24; 43 A.L.R. (2d) 136 (Q.B.).
24. Federal Business Development Bank v. WilIms et at, [1985] 6 W.WR. 380 (Alta. Q.B.)
and Prov. Treasurer (Alta) v. Woycenko (J.) & Sons et at (1986), 73 A.R. 229 (Q.B., Master).
It does not.
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deviation will be permitted? In reading these cases it has been my
impression that courts have given the G.A.A. a responsible, purposive
reading. Moreover, as a general rule there has been a tendency for later
courts to follow the reasons set down in the decisions that are technically
binding on them. Some coherent jurisprudence has been developed under
the Act. There are, for example, recognized leading cases -which are cited
repeatedly on certain points.25 I appreciate that these observations are not
supported. To do so would involve the discussion of about 100 reported
decisions. Even then I would be hard pressed to "prove" anything, for my
assessment is a pretty vague one. The point is simply that a reading of the
non-conflicts cases under the G.A.A. leaves me with the broad
impression that they are no worse (and no better) displays of adjudicative
justice than are other run-of-the-mill cases that fill our law reports. What
I will attempt to show, however, is that such an appraisal certainly does
not apply to the reported choice-of-law decisions under the G.A.A.
Im. The Cases
In this section I will examine the ten conflict-of-law decisions under the
G.A.A. I do not propose to offer an extensive case comment on each, but
I do want to do a little more than just summarize the decisions. I will
offer a brief critique of the cases and endeavour to evaluate how well they
succeed on their own terms. That is, since the reported cases adopt the
traditional, jurisdiction-selecting approach, I will try to appraise how
faithfully they succeed within that frame of reference. As well I will make
some observations about how well the decisions conform to values that
both choice-of-law camps advocate, such as fidelity to precedent and
internal consistency. I will not attempt at this stage to show how an
interpretive approach would have done a better job. That will come later.
There is one initial problem: what is a choice-of-law case? The
question is not answered as easily as some assume. For instance, a reading
of Teachers Investment and Housing Co-operative v. S.H. Properties
LDd 26 reveals that the defendant guarantor claimed to be from Phoenix,
Arizona, yet the plaintiff nowhere argues that the law of Arizona applies
and that consequently it would not matter that the defendant might not
have complied with the G.A.A.'s formalities. Furthermore, the court does
not bring up the issue on its own.27 Similarly, in Ampex of Canada Ltd
25. General PYre & Rubber Co. of Canada v. Finkelstein (1967), 52 W.W.R. 555; Edmonton
Airport Hotel Co. v. Credit Foncier Franco-Can., [1965] S.C.R. 441, affg 48 W.W.R. 641,
which affirmed 46 W.W.R 221 and, more recently, C.IB.C. v. Country Lane Furniture
Warehouse (Wetaskiwin) Ltd et a supra, note 21.
26. (1984), 55 A.R. 241 (Q.B.).
27. As it should not, at least under the traditional, jurisdiction-selecting approach. There are
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v. Thomson et at28 the out-of-province creditor did not argue the
inapplicability of the Act, and again the court did not raise the issue of its
own accord. In that case the principal debtor and the guarantors were all
Albertans and the guarantee was executed in that province, so one might
think that any argument for the G.A.A.'s inapplicability was doomed to
fail and was best left unarticulated. We shall see, however, that in some
similar situations creditors have been successful in arguing that due to
"foreign" factual elements failure to comply with the G.A.A. did not
invalidate the guarantee.29 The argument for applying foreign law in the
Ampex case was at least a plausible one, but it was not advanced. So the
question arises, are the disputes in Teachers Investment and Ampex
choice-of-law cases? The usual response is that they are not, that a
conflict-of-laws case is one which the parties and court consciously
recognize and treat as such. For the most part I am content to adopt this
approach. Thus the cases that follow are those that are treated (and,
happily, indexed) as such. But I cannot resist the temptation to question
the traditional method by including one30 case which seems to me to
contain significant multi-jurisdictional elements, even though it is not
treated as a choice-of-law case by the parties. I trust the significance of
this choice will become clear in due course.
1. Sham Importing Ltd. v. Babchuck, [1971] 4 WWR. 517, 21 D.L.R.
(3d) 349 (B.C.S.C.).
The first reported choice-of-law decision arising under the G.A.A. was a
case with few Alberta contacts. Moreover it was not a case tried in
Alberta. In Sham the defendant guarantor, an experienced businessman
whose principal activity was the promotion of mines, was a resident of
British Columbia and the creditor was a corporation with its plant and
head offices in Quebec. The guarantee, however, was given to cover the
debt of a corporation (a shoe store) of which the defendant was president,
principal shareholder and managing director, and this debtor corporation
had its main retail outlet in Edmonton. One fact was in doubt: the place
of execution of the guarantee. It was the defendant's contention that the
other indications in the case that the defendant had connections with Edmonton as well, so it
may well be that a plea for the application of Arizona law would be unlikely to succeed here,
but that does not weaken my general point.
29. Ampex of Canada Ltd. v. Thomson et aL (1979), 11 Alta. L.R. (2d) 303 (Q.B).
29. See eg., the discussion of O'Donovan et ux v. Dussault et aL, supra.
30. Avco Delta Corporation Canada Ltd et aL v. MacKay, [1976] 4 W.W.R. 312 (Alta. Dist.
Ct.). See the discussion, infra In addition there is a choice-of-law dispute under the G.A.A. in
which a preliminary application has been decided: Associate Capital Services Corp. v. Multi
Geophysical Services Inc. et aL (1986), 44 Alta. L.R. (2d) 186; 73 A.R. 364 (Q.B.). No final
judgment has been reported in that case and it will not be discussed in this paper.
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guarantee had been signed in Edmonton, from where it had undoubtedly
been mailed to the plaintiff, and that the lex loci contractus should
govern. Thus, the defendant contended, the G.A.A. applied and the fact
of non-compliance rendered his guarantee void. The court eventually
decided that the lex loci contractus was not Alberta. It found that the
guarantee had been signed and therefore executed by the defendant while
present in B.C. and that that was enough to dispose of his argument that
non-compliance with the G.A.A. invalidated the contract. In the court's
view31 the mere fact that the underlying debt might have Alberta
connections was not enough to place the defendant in a position to argue
for the application of the G.A.A. The territorial connections of the
underlying debt were irrelevant to choice-of-law considerations bearing
on a guarantee of such a debt. The defendant did not even get across the
threshold.
The court's finding on the issue of place of formation of the contract
is curious because in terms of traditional contract-formation doctrine we
would not normally think that the place of signing was determinative of
the place of execution. The guarantee was undoubtedly mailed from
Edmonton to the plaintiff creditor's office in Quebec, and traditional
rules would dictate that, no matter where the guarantee was in fact
signed, the contract was not complete until it was placed in the mailbox
in Edmonton. After all, the defendant could have signed the guarantee
but then changed his mind and ripped it up or simply failed to post it. If
that had happened no one would think that there was a completed
contract. Only communication of the acceptance to the plaintiff would
act to complete the contract. Consequently there should have been no
doubt that, no matter where the document was signed, the contract was
executed in Alberta. The court did not even deal with this argument.
The court, however, was prepared to consider the result that should
follow if it was wrong in finding that the suretyship was signed (and
therefore, in its view, completed) in British Columbia. It was prepared to
accept for the sake of argument the defendant's contention that the
contract was executed in Alberta. It stated that even if this were the case
it would reject the defendant's argument, which was based on the first
presumption under sub-rule 3 for Rule 127 of Dicey & Morris, that the
lex loci contractus should prevail. Instead it would apply the second
presumption under that rule:
If a contract is made in one country and is to be performed either wholly
or partly in another, it may sometimes be presumed to have its closest and
most real connection with the law of the country or of one of the countries
31. [1971] 4 W.WR. 517 at 519; 21 D.LR. (3d) 349 at 351 (B.C.S.C.).
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where performance is to take place (lex loci solutionis). This presumption
is strongest where all parties have to perform in one country.3 2
The court found that either B.C. or Quebec was the place where
performance - that is, payment by the guarantor should the principal
debtor fail to repay - was to take place. It expressly rejected the
defendant's submission that factual connections pertaining to the
underlying contract, such as the fact that the shoe business for which the
guarantee was given was in Alberta, should be taken into account in
determining the proper law of the contract. It thought that the parties'
intentions were a vital factor in determining the governing law33, but that
their intentions regarding the principal contract were irrelevant to their
intentions on the law governing the guaranty. In addition the court found
further support for the application of either Quebec or B.C. law in the
presumption in favour of the law upholding the validity of the contract.
That is, if a contract is valid by the law of either the place where it was
made or the place where it was to be performed it should be upheld.
So, according to the B.C. Supreme Court, the mere fact that a contract
of guarantee is executed in Alberta is not sufficient to attract the
application of the G.A.A. Provided there are a sufficient number of
foreign connections with the contract, compliance with the formalities
required by that statute appears unnecessary.
2. O'Donovan et ux. v. Dussault et al., [1973] 3 WWR. 634, 35 D.L.R.
(3d) 280 (Alta S.C., A.D.).
The first encounter of an Alberta Court with conflicts problems under the
G.A.A. arose in a case similar in many respects to Sham. O'Donovan
concerned a guarantee mailed from Alberta to an out-of-province
creditor to secure the debt of an Alberta corporation. As in Sham the
guarantor who sought to plead his non-compliance with the G.A.A. and
thus escape payment was an experienced businessman, a fact emphasized
by the court.34 And as in Sham the court did not permit him to escape.
Reaching this result was more difficult in O'Donovan than it had been in
Sham because here the guarantor was not a foreigner but an Alberta
resident and the signing of the guarantee in that province was no
fortutitous event.35 One might have thought that when out-of-province
creditors dealt with Alberta guarantors the result might be the protection
of the latter.
32. Dicey & Morris on the Conflict of Laws, (8th ed. London: Stevens, 1967) at 712. The
extract is quoted in Sham at 523 (W.WR.) and 354 (D.L.R.).
33. Supra, note 31 at 524 (W.W.R.) and 355 (D.L.R.).
34. [1973] 3 W.W.R. 634 at 640-1; 35 D.L.R. (3d) 280 at 286 (Alta. S.C., T.D.).
35. I am not entirely sure what makes one event more fortuitous than another. The word is
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In O'Donovan the trial judge had found that the G.A.A. applied and
had excused the defendant. The Appellate Division reversed. It did so on
the basis of its finding that the law of the creditors' residence,
Saskatchewan, was the applicable law. This finding involved some fancy
moves on the part of the court. The first of these was to find that the
contract was made in Saskatchewan. The guarantors, whose Alberta
corporation had previously been advanced money by the plaintiffs,
executed a promissory note for repayment and a guarantee for that debt
in Alberta and mailed them together, with duplicates of each, to the
creditors' residence in Prince Albert, Saskatchewan. That mailing also
included a piece of paper for the creditors to sign as witnesses, which they
did, mailing the signed duplicates back to the guarantors in Alberta.
Having recited these facts the court found that both the principal debt and
the guarantee became effective when the plaintiffs signed as witnesses in
Saskatchewan.
This finding is strange indeed. Well recognized, traditional rules of
offer and acceptance dictate that the note and guarantee were both
executed when they were placed in the mailbox in Alberta.36 The
contracts certainly did not need either the creditors' signatures as
witnesses or the return of the duplicates to become effective. The
documents mailed from Alberta were not offers, they were acceptances.
The court in O'Donovan took a different view of the rules of contract
formation than the Sham court did. Sham had departed from the
traditional postal acceptance rule by moving the time of formation back
to the signing of the document. The court in O'Donovan, which did not
refer to the decision in Sham, went the other direction, moving the time
of formation ahead to the offerors' acknowledgement that they had
one which is used by courts in conflicts cases from time to time. In fact it was employed by
the B.C. court in Sharm "The execution of the contract in Alberta, if it was executed there, was
entirely fortuitous, because the defendant happened to be visiting Alberta at the relevant times,
and this fortuitous event could not reasonably have been intended by the parties to fix the
proper law of the contract." (At 524 (W.W.R.) and 355-6 (D.L.R.)). The court appears to
mean that the event was fortuitous because it was unexpected, or at least considerably less
likely to occur than certain other events. It is by that measure that I call the Alberta signing
of the guarantee in O'Donovan "not fortuitous": at no relevant time were the signers outside
Alberta.
36. It is arguable that both the principal contract and the guarantee were in fact formed earlier.
The court notes, at 635 (W.W.L) and 281 (D.L.R.), that the deal was first worked out over
the telephone. "The money was advanced immediately but before it was received it was agreed
between the plaintiffs and the defendants that the loan would be for six months and would be
personally guaranteed by the individual defendants." Under the traditional approach it is open
to argue that both the principal contract and the guarantee were made over the telephone and,
though they might not become enforceable until there was compliance with the Statute of
Frauds, the contract was formed in the jurisdiction in which the acceptance of the offer was
heard. The court did not explore this route.
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received the acceptance of their offer. The decision in O'Donovan also
differed from that in Sham in other ways. It assigned different weight to
certain factual findings in its determination of the governing law. The
Alberta court, for instance, thought that the law governing the underlying
contract was of importance in finding the law governing the guarantee.
And since, by the same deviation from the orthodox rules of contract
formation, the Alberta court had found that the place of formation of the
principal debt was Saskatchewan, this fact could be used to add a
Saskatchewan contact to the task of choosing the governing law for the
guarantee. That fact - place of formation of the underlying contract -
was then found to be dispositive of the matter. No reasons were offered
for departing from Sham's view that the "location" of the underlying
contract was irrelevant to determining the law governing the guarantee.
Unlike Sham, where the court was prepared to hold that place of
formation was not a governing matter, the court in O'Donovan first
manipulated the law to bring the place of formation out of Alberta into
Saskatchewan and then found that one fact determined the proper law of
the contract. 37
Nevertheless O'Donovan resembled Sham in one significant respect:
non-Albertan creditors, who had likely never heard of this singular
Alberta statute, were not required to ensure that their Alberta guarantor
complied with it.
3. Avco Delta Corporation Canada Ltd. et al. v. MacKay, [1976] 4
WWR. 312 (Alta. D.C.), aff'd [1977] 5 WWR 4, 76D.L.R. (3d) 541,
4 A.R. 565 (A.D.).
Four years after O'Donovan the Appellate Division of Alberta's Supreme
Court had a second encounter with a guarantee by an Albertan of a
promissory note found to be made without the province, but this time it
did not recognize that it might be dealing with a conflict-of-laws case. In
contrast to the findings in the previous two cases, the court in McKay had
no doubt that it was dealing with a guarantee that had been executed in
Alberta. Moreover the courts, both at trial and on appeal had no doubt
that a guarantee executed by an Albertan in Alberta was governed by the
Act, and both courts found the guarantee unenforceable for non-
compliance.38 Yet MacKay, like O'Donovan, was a dispute involving
37. Another recent example of a provincial appellate court manipulating the mailbox rule to
avoid applying a statute which would void an otherwise acceptable commercial agreement is
Province of Nova Scotia v. Weymouth Sea Products Ltd et aL (1983), 61 N.S.R. (2d) 411
(N.S.S.C., A.D.), affg. 59 N.S.R. (2d) 181 (N.S.S.C., TD.).
38. The Appellate Division in fact released the guarantor on other grounds, but it would have
been prepared to find non-compliance with the G.A.A. sufficient reason for dismissing the
plaintiffs suit.
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guarantee by an Albertan of a promissory note which was payable
outside of Alberta. This fact - the law governing the underlying contract
- had been considered significant in O'Donovan but in MacKay was not
even treated as raising a choice-of-law issue. MacKay had more foreign
contacts than O'Donovan since in MacKay the principal contract was
clearly executed outside of Alberta. No manipulation of contract-
formation orthodoxy was necessary to locate the principal contract
outside of Alberta. The second time around, however, the Appellate
Division was not prepared to protect the creditor.
The decision is in accord with the traditional approach to conflicts
which treats choice of the applicable law as a matter to be raised by the
parties. The creditor in MacKay did not choose to argue that Alberta law
might be inapplicable to this guarantee of a "non-Alberta" debt, so the
courts were right not to raise the matter on their own.
4. Greenshields Inc. v. Johnston et al., [1981] 3 WWR. 313, 28 A.R.
1, 119 D.L.R (3d) 714 (Q.B.), affd [1982] 2 WWR. 97, 17 Alta. L.R.
(2d) 318, 35 A.R. 487, 131 D.L.R. (3d) 234 (C.A.).
Like O'Donovan, Greenshields was a case of a non-conforming guarantee
given by an Alberta resident to cover the debts of his Alberta company,
but this time the guarantee was incontestably executed in Alberta.39
Moreover the creditor had an office in Edmonton and received the
guarantee there. The only reason for thinking that a foreign law might
govern the transaction was the fact that the document contained the
following provision:
This guarantee shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the
province of Ontario.04
The trial court, citing and following Castel's Introduction to Conflict of
Laws, was prepared to hold the contract formally valid if it met the
requirements of either the place where it was made or those of the proper
law.41 Since it obviously could not be held valid on the former ground it
remained for the court to use the latter. Could the clause cited above have
39. At least no attempt was made to argue that the contract of guarantee was formed outside
of Alberta. Given the ingenuity of the courts in Sham and O'Donovan one wonders whether,
even with the overwhelming Alberta contacts in Greenshields, it might have been possible to
construe the guarantee as having been formed in Ontario.
40. [1991]3W.W.R313 a 319; 28 A.R. I at6; 119 D.L.R. (3d) 714 at719 (Alta. Q.B.).
41. At 319 (W.W.R.), 6-7 (A.R.) and 719 (D.L.R.). It is curious that the court chose not to
refer to Castel's major text, Canadian Conflict of Laws, (Toronto: Butterworths, 1975). The
Introduction to Conflict of Laws (Toronto: Butterworths, 1978) is a short student handbook
which describes itself as "not a scholarly work" (p. iii) and which advises the reader to consult
the general text for fuller discussion. Had the court in Greenshields done this it would have
found that the matter was not as simple as the student version makes it out to be.
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the effect of making the law of Ontario the proper law of this Alberta-
centered agreement?
Perhaps the first point to note is that the provision in question does not
claim to make the proper law of the contract that of Ontario. It merely
stated that the agreement should be construed in accordance with those
laws. It is certainly possible for an agreement to have a proper law in one
jurisdiction yet refer to the rules of construction of another jurisdiction.4 2
The court, however, did not appear to recognize this possibility; it treated
the provision quoted above as though it purported to make the law of
Ontario the proper law of the contract.
The issue then became one of deciding whether or not the clause
should be given effect. The trial court thought it should, and the Court of
Appeal agreed. The appellate court's reasons are a brief adoption of those
given at trial, so it is to the reasons for judgment in the court of first
instance that we must turn. Medhurst, J. quoted two tests which might be
used to determine this question. One was taken from Dicey and Morris
on the Conflict ofLaws:
No court, it is submitted, will give effect to a choice of law ... if the
parties intended to apply it in order to evade the mandatory provisions of
that legal system with which the contract has its most substantial
connection and which, for this reason, the court would, in the absence of
an express or implied choice of law, have applied.43
The second test was that given by Lord Wright in Vita Food Products
Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. Ltd44 That test states that a choice of law
clause will be given effect "provided that intention expressed is bonafide
and legal, and providing there is no reason for avoiding the choice on the
ground of public policy". 45
Having quoted both tests the court dealt only very briefly with the first.
Medhurst, J. did no more than to assert: "It cannot be said that this
choice of law clause was inserted for the purpose of evading the Alberta
statute. '46 He made no effort to inquire into whether Alberta's G.A.A.
was, in these circumstances, a mandatory provision that would otherwise
be applicable. Medhurst, J. only pursued the Vita Food test of whether
the contractual provision was contrary to Alberta's public policy. He
found that the clause did not violate any essential principle of justice and
42. For a discussion of this see Cheshire and North's Private International Law (10th ed.,
1979) at 239-40.
43. 321 (W.W.R.), 8 (A.R.) and 720 (D.L.R.). The quotation is from Dicey andMorris on the
Conflict of Laws, supra, note 32 at 699.
44. [1939] 2 D.L.R. 1; [1939] A.C. 277 (P.C.).
45. The quotation is from [1939] A.C. 277 at 290. It is reproduced in Greenshields at 320
(W.W.-), 7 (A.R.) and 720 (D.L.R.).
46. Id, 323 (W.W..), 10 (A.R.) and 722 (D.L.R.).
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was not in any way morally repugnant and that consequently the clause
did not offend the rules of public policy and should be given effect.
The effect of the application of this test is to permit any parties - or
at least those persons signing guarantees with some non-Alberta
connections, no matter how tenuous 47 - to avoid the G.A.A. by the
mere insertion of a choice-of-law clause. The G.A.A. can be contracted
out of. It is noteworthy that, since Greenshields, the House of Lords has
expressed disapproval of the Vita Foods test and limited the ability of
parties to avoid the applicability of mandatory statutes through choice-of-
law clauses.48
5. Jorges Carpet Mills Inc. v. Bondar et al., [1981] 4 W.WR. 470 (Alta.
Q.B.).
Jorges Carpet Mills is similar to O'Donovan in that it was a decision of
an Alberta court concerning a non-complying guarantee signed in
Alberta by Alberta residents for the debts of their Alberta corporation
and then mailed from Alberta to a foreign creditor. Although the Court
of Queen's Bench relied on the same authority cited by the Appellate
Division in O'Donovan - The Assunzione49 - this time it emphasized
the Alberta factual connections rather than the foreign ones and held that
the G.A.A. applied, thus invalidating the guarantee. The court thought
that the place of making was a significant connecting factor but, unlike
the courts in Sham and O'Donovan, it relied on traditional analysis to
determine that place:
The two guarantees were signed in the province of Alberta and became
effective upon being placed in the mail in Calgary by the personal
defendants for transmittal back to the plaintiff in Georgia. In short the
guarantees were made in Alberta.50
In addition the court emphasized the residence of the guarantors and
the fact that the guarantees would necessarily have to bg enforced in
Alberta (a factor overlooked by the court in O'Donovan). In O'Donovan
47. The only real extra-Alberta connections in this case were the plaintiff's head office in
Toronto and the fact the bond orders in the underlying contract were placed through that
office.
48. The "Morviken" [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1. The "Morpiken" was followed in Agro Co. of
Canada Ltd et aL v. Owners and all Others Interested in the Ship 'Regal Scout" et aL (1983),
149 D.L.R. (3d) 412 (F.C., T.D.). In that case Cattanach, 3. held that certain provisions of
Canada's Carriage of GoodsBy WaterAct R.S.C. 1970, c. C-15 applied regardless of evidence
of contractual intent to exclude them. The provisions were construed as mandatory and
consequently the fact that the proper law of the contract might be that of Japan could make
no difference on this point
49. [1954] P. 150; [1954] 1 All E.R. 278 (C.A.).
50. [198114 W.WR. 470 at 475 (Alta. Q.B.).
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the Appellate Division, in counting up the relevant geographical factual
connections with the case, had stressed those aspects of the principal
contract that were connected with the foreign jurisdiction. There were
many such aspects in Jorges Carpet Mills for here, unlike O'Donovan, the
defendants had earlier made several trips to the foreign jurisdiction in
connection with the principal contractlst Moreover, the principal debt
and the guarantee for that debt were in United States dollars, and
authority relied on in both O'Donovan and Jorges Carpet Mills supports
the practice of counting currency of payment as a relevant connecting
factor in determining the governing law. The court in Jorges Carpet
Mills, however, returned to the approach in the Sham case and paid little
attention to the territorial aspects of the principal debt. Contacts which
had been considered relevant in O'Donovan were ignored here.
6. Bank of Montreal v. Snoxell et al. (1982), 44 A.R. 224, 143 D.L.R.
(3d) 349 (Q.B.).
Snoxell differs from the cases we have considered so far in that it was not
a choice-of-law decision. It concerned the enforcement of a foreign
judgment. In Snoxell the Alberta court was prepared to permit the
enforcement of a British Columbia judgment against an Alberta resident
guarantor who had executed the non-conforming guarantee in his home
province.
Quite correctly, at least in orthodox terms, the Alberta court saw
nothing to offend Alberta's public policy in the enforcement of this
judgment. It should not have gone into the merits of the B.C. decision and
it did not do so. It is quite correct for a forum court to enforce a foreign
judgment which represents a result opposed to what the forum court
would have decided had it heard the original action on the merits. The
same conclusion was reached in a similar case the following year when
the Alberta courts were asked to enforce a Montana judgment.52
Snoxell is interesting for our purposes, however, because it contains
some dicta on the choice-of-law issue. The Alberta Court noted that had
the original action on the merits been brought in the defendant
guarantor's home province the result would have been different: "Had the
plaintiff brought its action in Alberta the guarantee would have been
found to be unenforceable." 53 This statement is at odds with the Court of
51. Id, at 473.
52. First Interstate Bank of Kalspell NA. v. Seeley et aL (1983), 54 A.R. 285 (Q.B.). Snoxell
was a case under Alberta's Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. R-6,
while First Interstate Bank of Kalispell was a suit on a foreign judgment, but the same
principles applied to the enforcement of each. The Montana Court in Kalispell had applied
Montana law to the enforcement of a non-complying guarantee given by an Albertan.
53. 143 D.L.R. (3d) 349 at 350 (Alta. Q.B.).
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Appeals decision in Greenshields which, curiously enough, the court in
Snoxell purported to follow. The contract of guarantee at issue in
Snoxel though it had been executed in Alberta by an Albertan,
contained a clause similar to the one in Greenshields. The clause read:
This CONTRACT shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the
Province of British Columbia....
The guarantee also contained a forum selection clause in favour of the
B.C. courts, though the clause did not purport to exclude the jurisdiction
of other courts. In addition the guarantee contained a clause which would
appear to make it even more of a non-Albertan guarantee than the one
considered in Greenshields, namely, a statement that it should be deemed
to be made in British Columbia. Given all of this, the court's remark that
the guarantee would have been found unenforceable had the original suit
been brought in Alberta is difficult to reconcile with authority. It is
particularly difficult because the court in Snoxell quotes an extract from
the Greenshields trial decision to the effect that a contract will be
formally valid if it meets the requirements of either the place where it was
made or the proper law of the contract. Had the court been willing to
give effect to the provision stating that the guarantee, though executed in
Alberta, should be deemed to have been made in B.C. it could have
found that the agreement complied with the formalities of the lex loci
contractus. But even if the court had not been prepared to take this route
it could have followed the Greenshields route and found that the
agreement was valid in that the proper law of the contract, as determined
by the express provision in the agreement, was that of British Columbia.
Thus the guarantee should have been valid no matter where the suit was
brought. Finally, there was no apparent reason for the court to make the
remark about the guarantee's unenforceability in Alberta and it is difficult
to guess why it did so.
7. Kenton Natural Resources Corp. v. Burkinshaw et al. (1983), 47
A.R. 321 (Q.B.).
It is remarkable that Alberta law was found not to govern in Kenton
since it concerned a guarantee given by Albertans in Alberta to a creditor
which was an Alberta corporation. The foreign elements in the case were
almost totally limited to certain factual connections unrelated to the
contract of suretyship but rather connected to the principal debt, and
most previous cases had held that the character of the principal debt
should not be persuasive in determining the governing law of the
54. Id, at 352.
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guarantee. But then Kenton is not noteworthy for following previous
conflicts cases under the G.A.A. In fact, although the court cites a
number of previous decisions and learned conflicts authorities, it makes
no mention of any cases, conflicts or otherwise, previously decided under
the G.A.A.
The case concerned an agreement for the sale of a number of mineral
leases in Tennessee. The plaintiff was the prospective purchaser, an
Alberta company, and the defendants were Exotic Minerals Inc. (a
Nevada corporation which was acting as selling agent of the leases) and
the two Alberta principals of Exotic. When the deal failed to close due
to the inability of the vendor to make acceptable title the plaintiff brought
suit against Exotic for the return of its deposit. It also sued the personal
defendants as guarantors of Exotic's performance who in their defence
pleaded non-compliance with the G.A.A.
The court thought that the guarantee agreement would be valid if it
was in accordance with the proper law of the contract, the law having the
closest and most real connection with the transaction. To determine this
connection Stratton, J. was prepared to count up the factual contracts
which various aspects of the contracts had with various jurisdictions. In
Alberta's favour were the facts that the transaction (both the guarantee
and the principal contract) was negotiated and concluded in that
province; the plaintiff had its head office in Calgary; the guarantors were
Albertans who carried on their business there; the agreement was partly
performed there (pre-payment of the purchase price); and ownership of
the Tennessee leases was already held partly by Canadian interests. In
Tennessee's favour were the following facts (note that, unlike the
situation with the Alberta connections, most of them concern only the
principal transaction): the land in the leases was located in Tennessee;
those leases were partly owned by Americans; the balance of the
purchase price was payable in U.S. funds; the agreement could not close
without the favourable opinion of a Tennessee attorney; the land in
question would be drilled by a U.S. corporation; and the land records
office was located in Tennessee. Having considered the above the court
simply concluded:
As between the laws of Tennessee and Alberta I have concluded that the
law of Tennessee is the proper law of the contract. I am satisfied that
Tennessee law is the legal system with which the subject transaction had
its closest and most real connection and a just and reasonable businessman
involved in dealing in oil and gas interests in properties would have
selected Tennessee law if it had considered that problem at the time of
entering into the Agreement.55
55. 47 A.R. 321 at 331 (Q.B.).
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Since this objective counting of contacts apparently demonstrated that
the parties, had they turned their minds to the problem, would have
selected a law other than Alberta's, that disposed of the defence that the
G.A.A. had to be complied with.
8. Williston Basin State Bank v. Shearer et al. (1983), 28 Alta L.R.
(2d) 341, 38 C.PC. 303 (Q.B.).
This case concerned a guarantee delivered in blank form from North
Dakota to Edmonton, signed there by an Alberta resident (who failed to
comply with the G.A.A. formalities) and then personally returned to the
out-of-province creditor. The court, however, was not asked to rule on
the applicability of the G.A.A. The dispute was an application to dismiss
the claim on the guarantee on the grounds that it was a contract made in
Alberta and that the plaintiff, because it was not registered as an extra-
provincial company, was barred from commencing or maintaining any
action on such a contract. In spite of the fact that the applicability of the
G.A.A. was not in issue, Williston Basin State Bank is of interest here
because it, like Snoxel contains some dicta on the matter. In fact for my
purpose here the dicta on the G.A.A. are the most interesting part of the
case, and hereafter I will treat them as though they were the basis of the
decision.
The court wrote:
It is important to realize that there is no certificate as is required by the
Guarantees Acknowledgement Act of Alberta attached to the guarantees.
This would indicate to my satisfaction that the bank was not intending at
the time it had guarantees executed to use Alberta law or to regard the
guarantees as having been made in Alberta.56
To buttress this finding the court went on to find that the contract had
not in fact been made in Alberta. In so doing it followed contract
orthodoxy. It noted that, although the guarantor signed the guarantee in
Alberta, the contract was not complete until it was personally delivered
to the creditor in North Dakota, and consequently that contract of
guarantee was formed in North Dakota.
Insofar as I may be permitted to treat the obiter dicta as ratio and thus
to view Williston Basin State Bank as a decision about the G.A.A., three
points seem worthy of note. First, unlike the courts in Sham and
O'Donovan, the judge in this case followed traditional rules for
determining the place where a contract is made. Second, it is interesting
that the court notes that failure to complete a G.A.A. certificate may be
evidence that the parties did not intend to have Alberta law apply. This
56. 29 Alta. L.R. (2d) 341 at 344; 38 C.RC. 303 at 307 (Q.B.).
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suggestion is new. It treats a failure to act as though it were a choice-of-
law clause. Finally, the court gives prominence to the factor of place of
contracting. Although this may be explained by its need to resolve the
main issue (the right of unregistered foreign companies to sue in Alberta),
to the extent that it has implications for the G.A.A. issue it suggests that
since the contract was executed out of Alberta, compliance with the
G.A.A. was not necessary.
9. Lehndorf Property Management Ltd. v. McGrath et al., [1984] 3
WWR. 187, 25B.L.R. 164(B.C.S.C.).
With this case and the following one we return to the courts of British
Columbia. In Lehndorf persons executing a guarantee in B.C. made the
"mistake" of including in it a clause which read: "It is recorded that the
laws of the Province of Alberta shall apply to this Guarantee and
Indemnity."57 In spite of the clause no attempt was made to comply with
the G.A.A. Noting that some factual connections existed between the
principal contract and Alberta, 8 the court was prepared to give effect to
the parties' choice of law, find that Alberta law governed and hold that
the guarantee was of no effect.
Even judging by the criteria of traditional analysis and consistency
with previous decisions under the G.A.A., Lehndorfposes a number of
problems. Several earlier decisions - Kenton, O'Donovan, even the
decision of the B.C. court in Sham - had showed courts' willingness to
hold guarantees valid if they complied with either the lex loci contractus
or the proper law of the contract. Since the guarantee in Lehndorf was
valid by the internal law of British Columbia where it was made, it could
easily have been upheld by this rule. That is precisely what the court in
Sham had been prepared to do. Counsel for Lehndorf tried this argument
but this time around the court rejected it. Wetmore, L.J.S.C.
acknowledged that compliance with the law of the place of execution
was sufficient to make a contract formally valid; in fact, contrary to
authority, he appeared to suggest that compliance with the formalities of
the place of contracting was not merely sufficient but necessary.59 The
court's reason for rejecting the applicability of that argument in this
instance was a matter of characterization. It thought that the
requirements of the G.A.A. were substantive, not formal, and that
consequently no reference to the law of the place of contracting was
57. [1984] 3 W.W.R 187 at 189; 25 B.L.R. 164 at 166 (B.C.S.C.).
58. "The lease which is guaranteed is for property in Alberta and the principal debtor, the
lessee, is an Alberta company": IA, 189 (W.W.R.) and 166 (B.L.R.).
59. Id, at 189 (W.W.R.) and 167 (B.L.R.).
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possible. The "alternative-reference" test advanced by Lehndorf was
applicable only to matters relating to formal validity of contracts.
In considering the question of whether or not' the G.A.A.'s
requirements were substantive or merely formal the court made a
significant mistake of reasoning: it collapsed the substance/procedure
distinction and the substance/formality distinction. The court wrote:
The issue then is simply whether the requirement of a notarial certification
and the consequences of its absence, as provided in the Alberta statute is
a mere formality or procedural requirement on one hand, or a matter of
substance on the other.60
The court followed this statement with a quotation from the judgment
of Stevenson, J. A. in the Alberta Court of Appeal decision in
Greenshields in which the judge said that the requirements of the G.A.A.
were substantive. It then quoted the part of the G.A.A. which provides
that non-complying guarantees are of no effect and noted that "this goes
beyond mere procedure, such as, for example, a limitation statute which
does not extinguish a cause of action: it simply removes its enforceability
from the courts". 61
In orthodox choice-of-law methodology there is a clear difference
between the substance/procedure distinction and the substance/
formality distinction. Writers who support the traditional approach have
emphasized the importance of this difference.62 Briefly, if a matter is
characterized as procedural (as opposed to substantive) then, regardless
of the law chosen to decide the dispute, the procedural law of the forum
will apply. Similarly, no non-forum law characterized as procedural will
be given effect. If a contractual matter is characterized as a question of
formality (as opposed to substance) then regardless of whether the
contract is valid by the proper law it may be valid if it complies with the
formality requirements of the place of contracting. This is what the B.C.
court in Sham had done. The court in Lehndorf conflated these two
distinctions as the quotation at note 60 shows. The Alberta Court of
Appeal in Greenshields had most certainly not held that the G.A.A. was
substantive as opposed to formaL There was no conceivable need for it
to have done so since it had already held the contract as valid because it
complied with the proper law. It had held that the G.A.A.'s requirements
were substantive as opposed to procedural and it did so in order to reject
the defendant's argument that, even if the proper law of the contract was
the law of Ontario, the G.A.A. should govern since it was procedural and
60. Id, at 189-90 (W.W.R.) and 167 (B.L.R.).
61. Id, at 190 (W.W.R.) and 167-8 (B.L.R.).
62. Falconbridge, Essays on the Conflict of Laws (2nd ed. Toronto: Canada Law Book Co.,
1954) at 94-105.
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consequently should always be applied in any case before an Alberta
forum. Consequently, the court in Lehndorf was dead wrong in relying
on Greenshields for the holding that the requirements of the G.A.A. were
not requirements of formation. Similarly, the court's argument that the
G.A.A.'s requirements were not matters of formality could receive no
support from the fact that the consequences of non-compliance were that
the guarantees should have no effect. Many provisions previously
characterized as formal have this effect. The court was adopting a test
used in the substance/procedure distinction, not in the substance/
formality distinction. 63.
In any event, there are problems with ever holding that parties have
chosen a law that renders their contract invalid, especially when it is a
rule of formation.64 This issue had recently been dealt with by the B.C.
Supreme Court in Nike Infomatic Systems Ltd v. Avac Systems Ltd et
aL65 An issue arose as to whether the parties might have selected Alberta
law to govern part of their franchise agreement and whether that law
might render that part of the contract void.66 The court's response to this
argument was that "this interpretation could mean that the parties had
signed a worthless piece of paper. The law, where not compelled by the
intractable facts, tries to uphold contracts ... ,,.67 In the interests of
common sense the court in Lehndorfmight well have taken this track and
decided that the parties were referring to Alberta law as to the effect of
guarantees but not to Alberta's law of contract formation. In fact it
appears to have considered this point but rejected it on the grounds that
the G.A.A. was, in its view, substantive, not formal.
63. The complexities of the substance/procedure distinction ate potentially hazardous. The
distinction has a different significance in conflicts cases that it does in non-conflicts cases and
it may be dangerous for a court in a non-conflicts case to rely on a finding with respect to this
decision reached by a court faced with a choice-of-law problem. For an example of a court in
a non-conflicts G.A.A. case adopting the Greenshields finding regarding the substance/
procedure distinction see Alberta v. Ronsdale Construction et at (1984), 58 A.R. 115 (Q.B.)
at 125-6.
64. For an example of an American court dealing with this interesting problem see A.S.
Rampel Inc v. Hyster Co., 3 N.Y. 2d 369; 165 N.YS. 2d 475; 144 N.E. 2d 371 (1957).
65. [1980] 1 W.W.R. 528; 105 D.L.tR (3d) 455; 16 B.C.L.R. 139; 8 B.L.R 196 (S.C.). The
G.A.A. was pleaded in Nike, but no submissions were made on this point and the court did
not comment on it.
66. The choice-of-law clause in question read: "This Agreement is to be governed by and
construed according to the laws of the Province of B.C. If, however, any provision in any way
contravenes the law of any state or jurisdiction where this agreement is to be performed, such.
provision shall be deemed not to be a part of this agreement therein.": Id, at 528 (W.W.R.),
456-7 (D.L.R.), 141 (B.C.L.R.) and 199 (B.L.R.). The defendant argued that since certain
provisions of Alberta's Franchises Act, 1971 had not been complied with, the offending parts
of the contract should be struck out. The plaintiff argued that B.C. law applied to those parts.
67. Id, at 534 (W.W.R.), 460 (D.L.R.), 145 (B.C.L.R.), and 203 (B.L.R.). The court in
Lehndorf did not refer to Nike
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10. Morguard Trust Company v. Affkor Group Ltd et al. (1984), 55
B.C.LR. 1 (C.A.).
Morguard was an appeal from a judgment against two Alberta residents
who had executed a guarantee in Alberta 68 in respect of a mortgage given
to the plaintiff on land located in British Columbia. The plaintiff had
foreclosed on the property and had obtained judgment against the
guarantors.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal referred to the closest-and-
most-substantial-connection test and then listed the B.C. contacts with the
case: the mortgaged land was in B.C.; the mortgagor was a B.C.
company; the mortgage was executed in B.C. on B.C. standard forms; the
mortgage was registered in Victoria and payments on it were to be made
there. The Court of Appeal expressly approved of the Sham case, 69
which, it should be recalled, had explicitly rejected the notion that
elements of the principal contract should be relied on in determining the
proper law of the guarantee. (In Sham the principal contract was closely
tied to Alberta, and the court may have wanted to avoid the application
of Alberta law.) Nevertheless the Court also explicitly approved of the
notion that the same law that applied to the principal debt should govern
the guarantee of that debt. 0 Given the overwhelming connections
between the principal contract (the mortgage) and British Columbia the
court concluded that B.C. law was the proper law of the contract.
Consequently, it did not matter that these Alberta guarantors had not
complied with the provisions of the G.A.A. The British Columbia
creditor was protected.
IV. General Comments
It will surprise no one that my view is that, taken as a group, the decisions
we have just seen are crummy. First and foremost, by my count at least,
half of them reach the wrong result. Guarantees that should have been
avoided due to non-compliance with the G.A.A. are enforced, and vice
versa. An account of my reasons for saying this will follow in the next
section. For the moment I will baldly assert that the results are no better
than might be reached by flipping a coin.
Secondly, even after these ten cases, one cannot say that the courts
have sorted out how the G.A.A. will apply in future multi-jurisdictional
disputes. Proponents of the jurisdiction selecting approach cannot argue
68. Or at least this was apparently the case. It was asserted at (1984), 55 B.C.L.R. 1 (C.A.)
at 6 by counsel for the guarantors that this was the only reasonable inference from the facts,
and the court does not appear to have departed from this view.
69. Id, at 7.
70. Id, at 7.
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that, after some initial hesitation and difficulties, courts have at length
arrived at a consensus as to how the Act will operate in a choice-of-law
case. We have seen bodies of facts forced into spastic postures as the
traditional rules of contract formation are first pulled one way, then
another, and then applied in an orthodox fashion; the G.A.A.'s provisions
have been treated as formal, then as substantive, and then as formal
again; the geographical orientation of the underlying principal obligation
has been treated as irrelevant in some disputes and determinative in as
many others. Any one of these factors would alone be sufficient to give
rise to legitimate concern about ability to predict what will happen in the
next case. When they are taken together they produce almost total
unreckonability. This has consequences for persons who wish to plan
transactions. Possibly the most prudent route for a solicitor would be to
advise the completion of a certificate in any case with the remotest
Alberta connections. (At least notaries public would benefit from this.)
However, since some of these decisions (e.g. Kenton, Morguard,
O'Donovan) tell us that such a certificate is not always necessary, there
will clearly be considerable wasted transaction costs here. The courts in
those cases are telling us that a certificate would be superfluous. A reader
of Greenshields might think that these costs could be minimized by
simply inserting in the guarantee a clause to the effect that it should be
governed by the law of some jurisdiction other than Alberta. That would
supposedly eliminate the need for compliance with the G.A.A. Such a
tactic, however, would be no guarantee of success. There are costs in
determining the content of the laws of foreign jurisdictions and, as the
creditors in Lehndof found out, dangers in neglecting to do so.
Moreover, the dicta in Snoxell suggest that Alberta courts may not
always pay attention to such choice-of-law clauses. The task of getting
the traditional rules to reach predictable results while still conforming to
stare decisis seems Sisyphean.
The indeterminacy here is much like that which prevailed in the
United States before most states went over to an interpretive
methodology. Writing in 1948, Elliott Cheatham arrived at an evaluation
of the American courts' handling of this problem which is equally
applicable to Alberta today.
Contracts are of the most diverse types and qualities, and yet the typical
opinion of an American court seeks to deal with them by laying down a
single rule applicable to all questions of validity for all types of contracts.
The method is unworkable and leads to evasion in two ways. One escape
is through changing from case to case the meaning of the key term in the
rule (Le., place of making) with the result that there are several rules in fact
masquerading under the one rule in form. The other method is to change
the rule itself from case to case, with each opinion referring to one of the
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rules and ignoring the others. A candid New York judge has pointed out
that in his state there are at least four rules going along together but
independently, each one seemingly ignorant of the existence of the
others.7
1
Finally, the decisions we have seen may well have spawned confusion
in other areas of the law. It seems to me that there is an obvious detriment
to the general (Le., non-conflicts) law in the manipulation of doctrines
such as the mailbox rule in order to reach apparently just results in these
cases. Some relatively clear waters are muddied and no compensating
advantage is gained. I do not mean to imply that, even apart from
conflicts cases, I consider the post-box rule to be some embodiment of
perfect justice to be tampered with only at our peril. Evidence to the
contrary is plentiful. Nevertheless, as a guideline for determining when
(as opposed to where) contracts are completed and consequently how
certain risks are allocated, the rule may at least provide parties who know
about it in advance some increased ability to operate with ability to
foresee likely consequences of their actions. I see no point in lessening the
already limited usefulness of such a rule.
To conclude this part let me quote Professor Robert Sedler's overview
of the consequences of the Michigan courts' traditional, jurisdiction-
selecting approach to choice of law in torts.
Choice of law in Michigan is in a shambles. It is impossible to predict
when the Michigan Court of Appeals or the federal courts in Michigan
will again decide to resort to "manipulative techniques", or when one
panel of the court of appeals will refuse to follow the lead of another panel
or of the federal courts in employing them .... The results in conflicts torts
cases are neither sound nor predictable. It is all one big mess.72
Canadian choice-of-law approaches leave us in the same mess.
V. The Interpretive Approach
The interpretive methodology would treat choice-of-law decisions arising
under the G.A.A. as being not essentially different from domestic cases.
The question of the Act's territorial application is structurally identical to
questions regarding the scope of its applicability in non-conflicts cases.
Consequently, what is required is a determination of the G.A.A.'s
purpose and an attempt to fulfill that policy as best as can be done, taking
into account the purposes of other relevant laws. This last task - that of
deciding when the G.A.A. must yield in the face of an argument that
some other rule should govern - does give rise to concerns in interstate
71. Cheatham, Book Review (1948), 48 Colum. L. Rev. 1267 at 1268 (footnotes omitted).
72. Sedler, supra; note 14 at 847. Since this article Michigan has espoused the interpetive
approach. See: Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental Ina, 413 Mich. 406; 320 N.W. 2d 843 (1982).
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cases that are of a different flavour than those in purely domestic
situations. Courts must attend to the interaction of different legal systems.
But this can be done without the interposition of jurisdiction-selecting
choice-of-law rules. The place to start, as in a domestic case, is with some
formulation of the purpose of the law in question.
Brief mention of the likely purpose of the G.A.A. was made earlier, but
elaboration is required here. Most legally trained persons would have
little difficulty in formulating some rough statement of the policy of the
G.A.A. The evidentiary, cautionary and channeling functions73 of legal
formalities are familiar to most lawyers and, within obvious bounds,
relatively uncontroversial. The cautionary role seems greatest here since
evidentiary concerns would already be addressed by the requirement that
guarantees be in writing. And if someone really should find the purpose
of the G.A.A. difficult to ascertain, the usual aids are available. For
instance the 1970 Report on the Act by the Alberta Institute of Law
Research and Reform contains that body's view of the legislation's goal:
The common purpose of the Guarantees Acknowledgement Act and of
the Statute of Frauds is the prevention of fraudulent practices. More
particularly, the Guarantees Acknowledgement Act is designed to protect
the ordinary individual who, through lack of experience or understanding,
might otherwise find himself subject to onerous liabilities at law, the
nature and extent of which he did not properly appreciate when he entered
into the undertaking in question. The statute seeks to provide this
protection by requiring that the person giving the guarantee must appear
before a notary public and that the latter must satisfy himself by
examination that the guarantor is aware of the contents of the guarantee
and understands it.74
Interestingly, this selection from the Institute's Report has been
referred to by Alberta courts in several non-conflicts cases under the
G.A.A. In Teachers' Investment and Housing Co-operative v. S.H.
Properties Ltd et aL75 for example, the court quoted part of the above
73. The terms are taken from Lon Fullers Consideration and Form (1941), 41 Col. L. Rev.
799 at 800-01.
74. The Institute of Law Research and Reform, Report No. 5, Guarantees Acknowledgment
Act (1970), at 2-3. The word "fraudulent" is arguably being used here in the wider, equitable
sense. I do not mean to suggest that prior to the Report the courts would have been or were
unable to formulate a view of the G.A.A.'s policy on their own. See, for example, the judgment
of Dechene, J. in General 7re & Rubber Co. of Canada v. Finkelstein (1967), 62 W.W.R. 380
(Alta. S.C.).
75. (1984), 55 A.R. 241 (Q.B.). Other cases to mention the Report of the Institute of Law
Research and Reform are Keillian West Ltd v. Sportspage Enterprises Ltd et al (1982), 23
Alta. L.R. (2d) 99 (Q.B.) at 103; CLRC. v. Country Lane Furniture Warehouse (Wetaskiwin)
Ltd et aL, supra, note 21; Teachers'Investment and Housing Co-operative v. S.H. Properties
Ltd, infra, note 76; and Alberta v. Ronsdale Construction Inc. et al (1984), 58 A.R. 115
(Q.B.) at 133.
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passage and expanded on it: "Clearly the Act is designed to protect the
inexperienced, the ignorant, the unwary and the ordinary individual by
insuring that he is aware at least of the general nature of the obligation
undertaken by him." 76
As well the court took note of an ancillary purpose of the G.A.A. Since
a certificate issued under the Act is conclusive proof that the Act has been
complied with,77 the existence of such a certificate may also be of benefit
to a creditor:
In my view the Act ... serves not only to give basic protection to the
ordinary individual, but also, once a Notary Public is satisfied that
guarantor understands the essential nature of the obligation he has entered,
and issues the Certificate required, then the creditor is spared from
spurious pleas of non estfactum8.7
It should be noted that the statements about the G.A.A.'s purpose in
the Teachers' Investment case were not a mere scholarly aside. They
served a function. There were irregularities in the notary's certificate in
that case and there was a real question whether the Act had been
complied with. The court used its view of the purpose of the G.A.A. and
its finding that the defendant was "a businessman who to the knowledge
of the Notary Public, had previously given other personal guarantees" 79
to arrive at the decision that in this case a mere technical non-compliance
should not avoid the guarantee.
It is revealing that no such inquiry into the purpose of the G.A.A. has
ever appeared in any of the conflicts decisions under the Act. Not one of
the conflicts decisions I have examined makes any express statement
about the Act's purpose being relevant to the question before it. The most
that could be noted is that some of the choice-of-law decisions made
explicit reference to the fact that the guarantor was experienced in
business matters, but the implication of such remarks was never made
clear.
I would like to sketch out briefly how the ten cases summarized above
might have been dealt with by courts prepared to take an interpretive
approach to choice-of-law issues. I do not suggest that the arguments that
will follow are exhaustive. Rather, they are meant to be representative of
the type of discourse that would emerge under this approach. And I
76. Teachers' Investment and Housing Co-operative v. S.H. Properties Ltd et aL (1984), 55
A.R. 241 (Q.B.) at 248.
77. G.A.A., supra, note 15, s. 5.
78. Supra note 76 at 248. The court did not suggest that compliance with the Act would
absolutely exclude a plea of non est factum, but it did opine that the plea would then be
successful in only the most exceptional circumstances.
79. Id, at 247.
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certainly do not maintain that the resolutions I will suggest are an
embodiment of perfect justice. I do think that the results I will proffer are
fairly fair and I will point out why, even if some of them are wrong, they
are vastly preferable to the dispositions reached under the jurisdiction-
selecting approach.
The first case to arise, Sham, would have been an easy one. The fact
that the guarantor was a resident of another jurisdiction should, I think,
have left little doubt as to the appropriate resolution. Having ascertained
the facts the court would inquire into the purpose of the G.A.A.
Assuming the policy of the Act would be roughly as spelled out above,80
the only question that Sharn presents is whether that purpose is somehow
forwarded or satisfied by requiring B.C. residents giving guarantees to
Quebec creditors to comply with the Act. I submit that the G.A.A.
should not apply here. It does not seem likely that the Act's purpose is to
protect B.C. guarantors, whether from B.C. creditors, from Quebec
creditors (as in this case) or even from Alberta creditors. Of course there
are no express words in the G.A.A. to lead us ineluctably to this
conclusion. On the question of its geographical scope the Act, like most
others, speaks "in terms of unqualified generality". 8' It does not tell us
whether the guarantors it is referring to are Albertans, Hawaiians or
Martians. There are no explicit instructions as to whether the creditors to
be included are only Albertans or are any creditors anywhere in the
world. It is the function of the conflict of laws to answer that question
and it is the goal of the interpretive method to answer it directly, by the
ordinary rules of statutory construction. In non-conflicts cases those rules
of construction had told us that the chief purpose of the Act was to
protect potential guarantors and the only new question here is, what
guarantors? Albertans? British Columbians? Both? I think the correct
answer, and the one that a court addressing this question directly would
80. It will be noted that here I speak of "purpose" and "policy" in the singular and that I have
just finished speaking of two purposes: one to protect unsophisticated guarantors and the other
to make spurious pleas of non estfactum and the like more difficult to maintain. Opponents
of the interpretive approach might have foreseen potential for disaster in trying to
accommodate two policies and might suspect me of deceit in trying to make one of those
purposes disappear. I think, however, that the two purposes will not conflict and, moreover,
that the second one may legitimately be dropped here. The first purpose arises in cases where
the Act has not been complied with and where the guarantor is attempting to use that non-
compliance to void the guarantee. The second arises where the guarantor is trying to plead non
est factum or misrepresentation and the creditor is relying on the fact that the Act has been
complied with. These will not normally arise in the same dispute, or at least not in the same
part of one dispute. Cases with which we are concerned present only the issues concerning the
scope of the first-mentioned purpose.
81. Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method (1958), 25 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 227. Much of the discussion that will follow is based directly on Currie's insights,
but its repetition here is integral to my argument.
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be likely to reach, is Albertan guarantors. Like all the jurisdictions with
which conflicts issues over the G.A.A. have arisen, Alberta believes in
freedom of contract, in the security of commercial transactions, in
vindicating the reasonable expectations of promisees. Unlike any of those
jurisdictions, however, Alberta has singled out a certain class of
commercial transaction for special protection. It is conceivable that
Alberta's legislators hoped to protect B.C. guarantors as well as Albertan
ones, but exceedingly unlikely. If B.C. was not concerned to protect them
why should Alberta think differently? If, in its purely domestic
transactions, British Columbia is prepared to let its guarantors take their
chances without the benefit of notaries public, what reason has Alberta
to think otherwise?
Should it make any difference then that, as in Sham, the guarantee is
executed in Alberta or that the principal debt has Alberta connections?
No. Admittedly there are many Alberta legislative provisions intended to
apply to foreigners who enter the province - standards of conduct on
the road, for instance, or zoning regulations. The question of whether an
Albertan rule of law should be spatially limited on the basis of residence
of the actor, place of acting or some other factor is one which will have
to be considered for each statute. With the G.A.A. a strong argument can
be made that the main factor should be residence of the guarantor. B.C.
guarantors should be permitted to roam the world without having to
comply with the G.A.A., even when mailing guarantees from Alberta.
Thus an interpretive approach to Sham would lead to the same result as
the jurisdiction-selecting approach did, but it would be supported by
different sorts of reasons - reasons which stated that it was not the
policy of the G.A.A. to apply to B.C. guarantors.
The second case, O'Donovan, would have been far more difficult.
What result should follow when a resident Albertan gives a non-
complying guarantee to a foreign creditor? This is what Brainerd Currie
called a true conflict and it presents the toughest case that will arise under
the Act. Indeed it presents a problem which may admit of no entirely
satisfactory solution using judicial resources alone. Alberta's policy of
providing some cautionary protection for certain of its citizens confronts
directly the policies of foreign states which are content to enforce
guarantees without the protection of the G.A.A. (or any statute like it)
and to leave the protection of possibly vulnerable guarantors up to
common law doctrines of non estfactum, undue influence, misrepresen-
tation and so on. Unlike Sham, O'Donovan presents a situation in which,
whatever way the case is decided, one jurisdiction's policy will be
preferred to the other's. On one hand, even though courts in domestic
cases had construed the G.A.A. to protect Albertan guarantors against
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Albertan creditors, even when those creditors may not have known about
the G.A.A., it might be unfair to impose on foreigners the costs of failure
to ascertain Alberta's domestic law. This is particularly the case when one
might discern in other aspects of Alberta's domestic policy, both
legislative and judicial, a policy of encouraging foreigners to invest in
Albertan enterprises. On the other, if Alberta is truly anxious to protect
its resident guarantors from their own ignorance, why should not foreign
creditors be held to the same standards as domestic ones? There may be
no readily available scale of mensuration for deciding which of these
policies should be preferred and which subordinated. Here the
interpretive approach finds no precise domestic analogue for the task that
confronts it. The conflict seems insoluble and one is inclined to think that
no amount of reference to the policy of the G.A.A. - however clearly
it might have been spelled out in non-conflicts decisions under the Act -
will provide much guidance.
It is worth noting that even though the currently accepted jurisdiction-
selecting approach does not pose this difficult issue explicitly it is
nevertheless present there as well. The actual decision in O'Donovan,
though it spoke of ascertaining the proper law of the contract, had the
effect of deciding that Alberta's policy of protecting its creditors should
be subordinated to Saskatchewan's policy of freedom of contract when
Albertan guarantors dealt with Saskatchewan lenders through the mails.
The true conflict was "resolved" even though the court appeared to be
doing no more than idly applying neutral rules in order to discover the
proper law of the contract. In favour of jurisdiction-selecting rules one
could argue that, if the problem really is beyond judicial resolution but
must nevertheless be resolved, it might be preferable to do so by appeal
to apparently neutral (even if arbitrary) rules. If the courts have no scales
in which to balance these policies and interests it might be best not to
pretend otherwise and to have recourse instead to an abstract set of meta-
laws.
I think the response here depends on how highly one values judicial
candour. Courts prepared to adopt an interpretive approach here at least
have available to them language which appears to have some connection
to the real issues at stake. A court faced with the facts in O'Donovan as
a case of first impression might, after looking at the whole of the G.A.A.
and at previous decisions under it, decide that the Act's policy was rather
weak and "suitable only for home consumption". 2 Such a court might
also be concerned to protect innocent foreigners against devious Alberta
borrowers who knowingly seek out foreign investors who have little
82. Id, at261.
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reason to be aware of the G.A.A. and induce those investors into taking
non-complying and unenforceable guarantees. It could thus decide that it
would be unfair to prejudice the foreign creditor. Alternatively it could
decide that the Act reveals a deep concern for innocent Albertan
guarantors and that the better choice would be to construe it expansively.
I think either course is open here and, unless a court would be prepared
to embark on some type of loss-sharing (some "half-enforcement"), there
is no middle ground. Let us then assume the worst about an interpretive
approach and assume that the court in O'Donovan makes a highly
arbitrary, "political" decision to prefer the local creditor at the expense of
the foreigner. (Though I am not prepared to go to the stake on the issue,
this is the result I prefer.) In so doing the court would give reasons to the
effect that foreign creditors who wish to exploit Albertan guarantors must
at least comply with the not-terribly-onerous provisions of Alberta's
G.A.A. Failure to do so, even through honest ignorance, will result in the
non-enforceability of the guarantee.
From the perspective I have adopted a number of the later cases look
virtually identical to O'Donovan. MacKay, Jorges Carpet and Williston
Basin State Bank are each cases of resident Albertans giving guarantees
to foreign creditors. Thus, whatever the result in O'Donovan, an
interpretive approach in that case would have afforded considerable
guidance in the later ones. O'Donovan could have become a leading
decision on this point. (It should be recalled that what actually happened
was that in two cases, O'Donovan and Williston Basin State Bank, the
foreign creditor was permitted to enforce the guarantee while in the other
two cases the effect of the decisions was to protect the Alberta guarantor
at the expense of the foreign creditor.83) Yet the reasons offered in the
three O'Donovan-like cases that followed O'Donovan in time purport to
distinguish those cases from O'Donovan in some way - or, failing to
mention O'Donovan at all, stress different elements. Do any such
differences truly exist that would, under an interpretive approach to the
Act, produce disparate results?
MacKay, the first case to arise after O'Donovan, does not appear to
differ from it in any significant respect. (It should be recalled that the
83. Admittedly in MacKay the guarantor was released on other grounds and the holding on
the G.A.A. is only an alternative ground of decision, but this fact does not weaken my point
here. The effect of decisions under the jurisdiction-selecting approach appears to bear only a
random relationship to the policy of the laws in question. For persons keeping track of my
assertion that at least half of the actual decisions reach the wrong result I note here that either
O'Donovan and Williston State Bank are wrong or MacKay and Jorges Carpet Mills are, for
all four are in essence the same case and there is no excuse for the 2/2 split. If we recall the
dicta in Snoxell we have another case that sides with MacKay and Jorges Carpet
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MacKay case was the one which was not treated as raising a choice-of-
law issue so the reasons offered there do not purport to distinguish it from
O'Donovan.) Thus, if the Alberta Court of Appeal in O'Donovan had laid
down an explicit rule that Albertans who mail non-conforming
guarantees from Alberta to foreign creditors are to be permitted to plead
the G.A.A. successfully I can see no reason for a subsequent Alberta
court in MacKay to differ. Even if counsel for the guarantor did not raise
the issue of the Act's application in space the court take judicial notice of
local law and raise the issue on its own.8 4
Jorges Carpet Mills does not differ from O'Donovan. Under a
purposive approach there would be little likelihood of the court in Jorges
Carpet Mills reaching a different result than an Appellate Court would
have reached in our hypothetical O'Donovan. One of the principal
factors by which the court in Jorges Carpet Mills distinguished that case
from O'Donovan, namely the place of making of the contract, would be
treated far differently under an interpretive approach. Under such an
approach the traditional contract formation rules, which were first
devised not to determine where a contract was completed but rather to
determine when it was completed, would be of little relevance. If the
transaction is negotiated by a series of letters, telephone conversations
and telexes passing back and forth between an Albertan guarantor and a
84. It is interesting to note, however, that should the Alberta court in O'Donovan have gone
the other way and, giving explicit reasons to that effect, decided that it was not within the
policy of the G.A.A. to protect the local guarantor who mailed a guarantee to a foreign
creditor, then an interpretive approach to MacKay would have presented some new difficulties.
Since interpretive methodology does not treat a multi-jurisdictional case as being structurally
distinct from a purely domestic one it should not be entirely up to the patties to raise issues
regarding the application of foreign law. As in a domestic case the court could conceivably
raise the issue of its own accord. But what would happen in a case such as MacKay where the
parties do not raise the issue of the possible applicability of foreign law and hence do not
inform the court of the content of that law? This appears to present a difliculty that is different
from the one that arises in a purely domestic case where the parties fail to raise issues as to the
non-applicability of that statute but where the court, for its own reasons, thinks the statute does
not apply. In a purely domestic situation the court has direct access to the rest of the local law.
If a certain statute does not apply then the court knows what law does apply. In a multi-
jurisdictional situation an Alberta court which thought that the G.A.A. did not govern a given
dispute but which had been given no information as to the content of the law in the jurisdiction
whose rule should apply would appear to be in a quandary. The traditional rules which treat
foreign law as a question of fact would appear to be at an advantage here. (See Castel, Proof
of Foreign Law (1972), 22 U.T.LJ. 33.) I think, however, that an approach which treats
foreign law as a question of law 1presents no insuperable problems. The Americans, at least in
Federal Courts, have been moving this way since 1966: see Brown, 44.1 Ways to Prove
Foreign Law (1984), 9 Mar. Law. 179. In fact in the situation we are hypothesizing here it
would not be the least bit difficult for an Alberta court to ascertain B.C.'s law of guarantee
formation. The court faced with the decision we are imagining could easily decide that, since
the G.A.A. did not govern the situation and since B.C. did not require notarial certificates for
guarantees, the suretyship in question should be enforceable.
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foreign creditor, then the place of formation, as determined by the
traditional rules, gives us little guidance in fulfilling the purpose of a
statute like the G.A.A. I am not suggesting that those rules be changed,
simply that they are practically irrelevant to this issue. The crux of the
matter is Albertan guarantors communicating at a distance with foreign
creditors. Thus, if a purposive, interpretive approach to O'Donovan had
produced reasons for judgment to the effect that the foreign creditor was
to be protected, it would be incorrect for a subsequent court in a case like
Jorges Carpet Mills to reach a different result by virtue of the traditional
contract formation rules. Similarly, if O'Donovan opted for protection of
the Alberta guarantor, Jorges Carpet Mills would have to do the same.
Williston Basin State Bank, 5 however, may be a tougher case, at least
if we continue to assume that the proper result in O'Donovan, MacKay
and Jorges Carpet Mills is to protect the Alberta guarantor at the expense
of the foreign creditor. There is a plausible and rational basis for
distinguishing it from the above cases. In all of the above instances the
guarantees were mailed from Alberta to the foreign creditor. All
communication was at a distance. The defendant guarantors were stay-at-
home Albertans. In Williston Basin State Bank the guarantee, though
mailed in blank from North Dakota to Alberta, once completed was
personally delivered by the guarantor outside of Alberta. Would an
Alberta court which had done what I suggest in O'Donovan be prepared
to "extend" the scope of the statute and protect Albertans who contract
outside Alberta? Again I do not think that the essential difference of a
case like Williston Basin State Bank depends on the rather arbitrary
contract formation rules. The distinction is a much more functional one.
Here the guarantor stepped outside the province and dealt face to face
with the foreign creditor on the creditor's home turf. To make the
argument that counsel for the Bank might advance, are Albertans to be
permitted to roam the world (perhaps even disguising the fact of their
Albertan residence) giving non-complying guarantees and then retreat
home to plead successfully the provisions of the G.A.A.? Certainly a line
has to be drawn here, particularly since residence may be a nebulous
concept. We would be reluctant to permit an "Albertan" who spent six
months of the year in Florida to plead the G.A.A. as a defence for some
guarantee substantially negotiated in that state. My view of Williston
Basin State Bank is that, at least from the facts that appear in the reported
decision, it does not appear to differ greatly from O'Donovan, MacKay
85. It should be recalled that for the purposes of this paper I am elevating the dicta in this case
to the status of ratio. The case was not decided on the G.A.A. issue. Nevertheless, the court
made it clear that Alberta law did not apply and that it would not have held the guarantee void
for non-compliance and it is this point that interests us here.
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and Jorges Carpet The guarantee was mailed by the foreign creditor into
Alberta and this foreign creditor should be subjected to the same
standards as were the plaintiffs in the other three cases. There are other
facts I would want to know, however, before being confident in this
conclusion. For instance, who initiated the transaction? Did the foreign
bank advertise in Alberta and entice Albertans across the border (in
which case we might be unwilling to excuse compliance with G.A.A.) or
did this Albertan go in search of foreign capital on his own initiative (in
which event we would be less likely to permit him to hide behind the
Act)? In any event a line must be drawn somewhere. At a minimum,
even if Alberta courts should decide that the policy of the G.A.A. requires
the protection of Albertans wherever they might roam, it would be
necessary to arrive at some definition of what constitutes an Albertan.
My point is that it is this sort of question which is really at stake here and
that it can be addressed in a purposeful, rational manner, just as the
Albertan courts in non-conflicts cases under the G.A.A. have had to face
the issue of what constitutes a guarantee.
There is another order of problem here. Would it be constitutionally
permissible for Alberta to offer its residents this sort of protection against
foreign creditors? I will address that issue in a later section.
Greenshields is a far easier case. There an Albertan gave a guarantee
to a company which was doing business in Alberta. Assuming
O'Donovan, etc. had chosen to protect the Albertan guarantor there
would be no doubt that the same should be done in Greenshields. Even
assuming the Appellate Division in O'Donovan had decided to go the
other way, giving the Act a restrained interpretation and favouring the
foreign creditor, there would be little reason for preferring the creditor in
the Greenshields case. True, as the court pointed out, the creditor's head
office was in Toronto and consequently it was in some limited sense a
foreigner. But the plaintiff creditor had chosen to open a place of business
in Edmonton and there is little reason not to subject it to local conditions
of doing business. Not to do so would be to treat it better than Albertan
corporations. Greenshields was essentially a case of an Albertan
guarantor giving a guarantee to another Albertan and there could be little
doubt that the Act was meant to apply to such situations.
There is one element of Greenshields that has not yet been mentioned,
the choice-of-law clause. Should the parties' selection of Ontario law 6
alter things in any way? I think that an interpretivist approach would lead
to the answer that, in this case, it should not. The question a choice-of-
law clause presents is whether it is permissible for parties to whom the
G.A.A. would otherwise apply to exclude its operation by an express
86. If that is what they in fact did. See the text at note 42.
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contractual provision. That is precisely what a choice-of-law clause seeks
to do. As far as I can tell Alberta's courts have never had to deal with any
case in which a creditor inserted in a guarantee a clause to the effect that
the guarantee should be binding regardless of failure to comply with the
G.A.A., but if such were the case I think there could be little doubt about
the appropriate judicial response. Though the Act nowhere expressly
states that it cannot be contracted out of, it seems likely that a court
would hold that it could not. If it is found to be part of the policy of the
Act that it should apply regardless of parties' intentions to exclude it then
there is little question about what to do with a choice-of-law clause in a
case like Greenshields.
This approach by no means entirely nullifies the operation of choice-
of-law clauses. They will be perfectly effective in areas in which parties
are otherwise free to contract. For example there would be nothing to
stop parties from using such a clause to exclude the operation of Alberta's
Sale of Goods Act and opting instead for the sales law of, say, Quebec or
Montana. This should be so regardless of whether the transactions have
"contacts" with those jurisdictions.
Kenton is probably the simplest case of the bunch. It is incomprehens-
ible that the G.A.A. was held not to apply to this transaction. It was a
dispute involving a guarantee given by one Albertan to another. In this
sense it is like Greenshields but here there is not even a choice-of-law
clause to cloud the issue. Virtually the only foreign elements concerned
the underlying principal debt. Given the policy of the G.A.A. is it likely
that it was not intended to apply when one Albertan gave another a
guarantee for some venture that happened to be carried on largely outside
of Alberta? What does the location of the underlying transaction have to
do with the policy of protecting Albertans from entering into guarantee
obligations without some assurance that they understand the nature and
extent of such obligations? Nothing.
In saying this I am not oblivious to how closely the giving of a
guarantee will usually be tied to the underlying debt. In the majority of
cases the principal obligation will be, in either a technical or non-
technical sense, conditional on an accompanying guarantee. For many
purposes we would need to look at both transactions together. To
examine one without the other would be to strip it of its context.
Nevertheless, even if the principal debt and the guarantee are viewed as,
in some sense, a single, composite transaction, that is no reason to
consider aspects of the "non-guarantee" part of such a transaction as
relevant to the applicability of the G.A.A. The over-riding focus for that
issue is still the residence of the guarantor. An interpretive approach
would therefore require compliance with the G.A.A. in Kenton.
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Lehndof is a curious case. It appears that, in connection with a lease
of Alberta property, a standard-form Alberta guarantee was executed by
two British Columbia residents in their own province. Lehndorf is a
property management firm with offices in major cities in both provinces
and it seems that, in conjunction with a lease of Alberta property which
was handled by one of the Alberta branches, documents (including an
Alberta standard-form guarantee) were forwarded to a B.C. office which
was to have them completed by guarantors in that province. The
guarantee document contained a choice-of-law clause in favour of
Alberta but no attempts were made to have the guarantors comply with
the G.A.A. Should the Act apply? The question may be approached by
first asking whether, even in the absence of a choice-of-law clause, the
G.A.A. would pertain to this transaction. As in Sham there would be no
reason to believe that the G.A.A.'s policy would be forwarded by
applying it to British Columbia guarantors. If their own domestic law is
content not to protect them in this way there is no call for Alberta's law
to do so.
The question remains, however, whether the choice-of-law clause
changes this. It has been argued that parties otherwise subject to the
G.A.A. should not be permitted to use choice-of-law clauses to evade it,
but it by no means follows that persons otherwise beyond the Act should
not be permitted to contract into it. But was that what the parties in
Lehndorf intended to do? At first glance there is something a trifle odd
about assuming that parties who never made any move to comply with
the G.A.A. intended to have it govern their transactions. It is a bit like a
case of an oral agreement which no one ever attempts to commit to
writing but which includes the phrase, "this agreement shall be subject to
the Statute of Frauds". One is tempted to think that - at least with
respect to the G.A.A. - the parties here did not entirely appreciate what
they were doing. The problem is then essentially one of contract law.87
Should these parties be visited with the (probably) unintended
consequences of their literal words? The problem is not like one in which
parties unknowingly contract to do something which is illegal or
otherwise against public policy. We have no difficulty in finding such
contracts unenforceable. But it is not otherwise a part of the public policy
of either Alberta or British Columbia that B.C. guarantors comply with
the G.A.A. The facts in the reported decision do not tell us everything we
87. It is just conceivable that the clause was somehow arranged by the wiley B.C. guarantors
at the expense of the unsuspecting creditor. The guarantors would then know at the time of the
signing of the agreement that a literal application of the words of the guarantee would make
it a worthless piece of paper. Contract law has sufficient tools to control this abuse of
bargaining power and to protect the reasonable expectations of the creditor here.
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would want to know in order to solve this problem conclusively, but I am
inclined to think that a purposeful reading of the Act and a sensitive
approach to contract interpretation would lead to the conclusion that the
parties never intended to make compliance with the G.A.A. a part of
their transaction and that the guarantee should be enforceable without
compliance.
Of course there are problems with declining to accede to the parties'
request for Alberta law here. Contracting persons may often choose the
law of a given jurisdiction without knowing every detail of its
ramifications, and the after-the-fact relieving of one of the parties from
the unforeseen negative consequences of its choice smacks of re-
allocation of a consciously allocated risk. Nevertheless the stronger
argument in Lehndorf seems to be that any apparent opting into the
G.A.A. was a sort of common mistake and that compliance with the Act
should not be required. An interpretive approach at least permits courts
to deal with this as a question of contract law (which it is) instead of a
"subtle argument on an area of conflict of laws ' 88 requiring reference to
some distinction between substance and procedure.
The final case in the series, Morguara, is another tough one. It is like
O'Donovan, MacKay, Jorges Carpet and Williston State Bank in that it
concerns a guarantee given by an Albertan and mailed (evidently) from
Alberta to B.C. The difference is that now we are before a B.C. court. If
O'Donovan had refused to protect the Albertan then the result in
Morguard would be simple. B.C. would have no reason to differ. To do
so would be to give a more extended interpretation to the Alberta statute
than the Alberta courts had and consequently to treat B.C. creditors more
harshly than Alberta courts were prepared to do.
But what if O'Donovan had decided that it was the purpose of the
G.A.A. to excuse Albertans who mailed non-complying guarantees to
foreigners? Need a B.C. court employing an interpretive approach to the
problem follow that lead when it is presented with the same problem? In
other words, must a B.C. court accord the G.A.A. the same broad
interpretation that an Alberta court had given it? As with the
constitutional issue adverted to above, there are unanswered questions
here, though again they are issues which exist but are masked under the
jurisdiction-selecting approach to the problem. The question is dealt with
at length by Professor John Swan in The Canadian Constitution,
Federalism and the Conflict of Laws39 and I agree with his conclusion"
that B.C. courts in this situation, though they should take into account the
88. Lehndorf supra; note 57, at 188 (W.W.R.) and 165 (B.L.R.).
89. (1985), 63 Can. Bar Rev. 271. See especially 315-18.
90. Id, at 318.
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same factors that the Alberta courts should, must be free to come to a
different conclusion.91 Thus Morguara, like O'Donovan, would be a case
of first impression and a B.C. court would have to balance its general
policy of bargain enforcement against Alberta's policy of protecting its
guarantors. Whichever policy was preferred the B.C. court would need to
support it with candid reasons.
VI. General Comments
Though the above analysis is hardly free from difficulties it is submitted
that the series of hypothetical decisions I have just sketched out is vastly
preferable to the existing series. Firstly, as to the correctness of the results,
Greenshields, Kenton and Lehndorf were wrongly resolved in the
original decisions and an interpretive approach would in all likelihood
have avoided that. Moreover, in the actual decisions, O'Donovan and
Williston Basin State Bank went one way while MacKay and Jorges
Carpet Mills, went the other. Since they are essentially the same case two
of the actual decisions must have been wrong. I tend to believe that
O'Donovan and Williston Basin State Bank were the incorrect ones, but
it does not matter for my present purposes that some persons might prefer
the results in those cases to those in the others. My point is that they are
all the same case and an interpretive approach would have led to the
same result in each.
Of course it is possible that the interpretive approach might, through
its consistency, have led to the "wrong" result in each, wrong in the sense
that Alberta's legislators would have preferred the opposite resolution.
Yet that still would have been preferable to the result in the reported
decisions. If, for example, an interpretive approach in O'Donovan had
given rise to reasons which stated that it was the purpose of the G.A.A.
to protect Albertans who dealt with foreign creditors, then, should the
legislature think such a disposition inappropriate, it could easily amend
the Act. It will be recalled that the G.A.A. has in fact been amended a
number of times. The legislature has evidently responded to pressure
from interest groups, to decisions from the courts and to the Law Reform
Institute and it could easily respond again here if it thought the court was
wrong. Advocates of jurisdiction-selecting rules might respond that the
same is true of their approach, that if the legislature did not approve of,
say, O'Donovan, it could make that clear in an amendment to the Act.
But this is incorrect. O'Donovan and the rest of the reported conflicts
cases adopt a style of discourse to which legislatures are not adapted.
91. That, of course, leads to the conclusion that B.C. courts might very well differ from the
Alberta courts on this issue and that consequently there would be a possibility for plaintiffs to
forum shop. This should be addressed by rules governing jurisdiction.
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Legislators are unaccustomed to amending jurisdiction-selecting choice-
of-law rules. If they disagreed with the result in O'Donovan it would not
be easy to amend the G.A.A. by saying, "the common-law proper law of
the contract rule shall not apply to the G.A.A.". (Especially since, ex
hypothesi they would believe that the rule would have led to the "right"
result in Jorges Carpet Mills.) Nor are law reform bodies inclined to take
on the common-law choice-of-law rules. It does not seem quite within
the mandate of a law reform institute charged to investigate the G.A.A.
to assume the task of reformulating the choice-of-law rules which courts
might have applied to it. Those rules seem part of a body of law external
to the legislation under consideration. And it should be recalled that in
neither of its two reports on the Act did the Alberta Institute of Legal
Research mention the choice-of-law decisions under the G.A.A. - in
spite of the fact that judicial decisions had referred to that area as a
troubling one.92 On the other hand, if courts should adopt an interpretive
mode and advance a purposeful construction of the territorial sphere of
the Act, that is precisely the sort of language that legislators and law
reform institutes could respond to. Similarly, it is the sort of language that
dissatisfied lobbyists can understand and challenge. It is for this reason
that I said that results under the interpretive approach, even though they
might be "wrong", are preferable to those in the jurisdiction-selecting
style, which are not only more likely to be wrong but less likely to be
legislatively corrected.
My second reason for preferring the interpretive approach is that the
series of hypothetical responses outlined above is a far more internally
consistent and progressively developed line of jurisprudence than we saw
in the actual cases. Later decisions respond to and perhaps modify or
build on earlier ones. Consistency of result is achieved. Persons reading
the interpretive series of cases might truly be able to predict the outcome
in the next. More importantly, potential lenders and guarantors could
actually plan their transactions with some degree of certainty. Of course,
the response to these assertions is that the actual series of cases we got
were decisions of a number of different judges in two different provinces
over a period of 15 years and that to compare their admitted waverings,
misunderstandings of earlier decisions and sub rosa changing of the rules
with the easily concocted response of one person is simply not sporting.
Fair enough. I can do nothing to balance the scales. I can only reply that
the actual jurisprudence developed in non-conflicts cases under the
G.A.A. seems responsive, relatively consistent and more or less clear and
that I see no reason why judges taking a purposeful, interpretive
92. See: C.LB.C. v. Country Lane Furniture Warehouse (Wetaskiwin) Ltd et al, supra, note
21 at 128.
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approach to multi-jurisdictional cases should do much worse than they
have done in domestic ones. It is the judicial approach that has generated
the inconsistency, not the underlying legal problem.
Finally, the approach I have set out requires no monkeying with
doctrines such as the post-box rule. Consequently, this method of
resolution of multi-jurisdictional disputes sends no unnecessary tremors
across contiguous areas of private law.
It is fair to note that the comparison of the two methodologies is
incomplete in that there appear to be numerous permutations which have
not been examined here. What, for example, do we make of the case
where two resident Albertans negotiate and complete a contract of
guarantee in a foreign state but neglect to comply with the G.A.A.? Such
a dispute has not arisen in the reported decisions but could easily present
itself tomorrow and a full discussion of the problem should consider it. I
do not propose to take up all of those hypotheticals in detail here. In fact
I think there are far fewer possible permutations than the traditional
approach would have us think. If we consider the numerous factors listed
in the reported, jurisdiction-selecting cases - residence of the guarantor
and of the creditor, currency of payment, place of contracting (variously
determined), the place where the guarantees would have to be enforced,
several different aspects of the underlying debt - those permutations run
into the hundreds. Moreover, if we were to consider in detail how the
traditional mode would fare in each of those permutations we would be
guessing in the dark. I honestly have not the slightest idea how the
traditional jurisdiction-selecting rules would respond to the case of two
Albertans contracting outside of Alberta. I doubt that anyone has. So any
hypothetical discussion of the full range of possible problems would be so
conjectural as to be useless.
In any event, the interpretive mode has reduced the problem to one
key factor: the residence of the guarantor. Some other factors may be
relevant (e.g. the creditor's residence) but most are not. To take the
example just mentioned, I think that an interpretive approach would hold
place of contracting to be of minimal importance here. If a substantial
part of the negotiations took place in Alberta, then we would want to
afford the guarantor the protections of the G.A.A., and the fact that the
guarantee was completed elsewhere would matter little. The Act should
govern in spite of the fact that the guarantee might be executed in another
jurisdiction. (Some support for this could be gathered from a source
which a jurisdiction-selecting rule would ignore: the G.A.A.'s definition
of "notary public"93 which contemplates that at least in some
93. R.S.A. 1980, c. G-12, s. 2(b).
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circumstances certificates will be completed outside of Alberta.) This
would have its limits, however. If two Albertans first encountered one
another in another country and negotiated and executed a guarantee
there, then, in spite of undiminished concern for the guarantor, we would
not want to defeat the reasonable expectations of the Alberta creditor
who thought he or she had left that jurisdiction's control over commercial
matters far behind. Again my main point is that an interpretive approach
permits us to draw the line between these instances by paying some
attention to the purpose of the law to be applied, and since the line must
be drawn in any event we might as well do it rationally.
Before making any concluding remarks it is necessary to examine a
problem that was put off earlier.
VII. The ConstitutionalDimension
There remains the possibility that courts employing interpretive choice-
of-law methodology might give the G.A.A. an effect that is beyond
Alberta's legislature to enact. The provincial power to make law here is
limited to matters of Property and Civil Rights in the Province,94 and to
suggest that the G.A.A. should protect a guarantor such as the one in
Williston Basin State Bank who personally delivered a guarantee in
North Dakota may be to proffer an extension of the statute which is ultra
vires a provincial legislature. That possibility has previously been
mentioned and deferred. I will now address the constitutional
implications of interpretive methodology. A solution to those
implications, however, is far beyond the scope of this paper. I will simply
sketch the outlines of the problem and indicate its relationship to the two
strains of choice-of-law methodology.
The first point is that precisely the same issues arise under the
traditional approach, though jurisdiction-selecting rules appear to have
the capacity to mask them. The court in Jorges Carpet Mills, for example,
used the common law rules regarding the proper law of the contract to
protect an Albertan guarantor at the expense of a foreign creditor. Since
it was adopting the traditional methodology the court did not speak as
though it was giving the G.A.A. an extended geographical interpretation,
but the result is the same as if it had. The fact that the result was justified
by the rule regarding the proper law of the contract can make no
difference to the constitutional question, for such rules have no
constitutional force. Nor are they congruent with the tests which have
been used to determine the constitutionally permitted geographical range
94. The Constitution Ac4 1867, s. 92(13) (emphasis added).
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of provincial legislation.95 The issue is hardly a hypothetical one. It has
been convincingly argued elsewhere that recent choice-of-law decisions
employing the traditional methodology have had the effect of giving
provincial statutes an unconstitutionally broad territorial scope. 96
But to say that the issue exists as well under the traditional approach
does not lessen its importance now that an interpretive methodology
forces us to face it squarely. Alas, the decisions rendered on this issue by
our courts of last resort have been inconsistent. We are confronted here
with legacy of RoyalBank of Canada v. The King,97 Ladore v. Bennet498
and The Queen v. Thomas Equipment 99 The recent decision in the
Supreme Court of Canada in Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation
Ltd et al v. Attorney General of Newfoundland et aL100 purported to
offer some resolution to this problem, but when we try to apply the
solutions suggested by that case to issues arising under the G.A.A. no
clear answers emerge.
The Churchill Falls decision at least makes it plain that the test for
constitutionality is not tightly tied to the relevant common-law choice-of-
law rule. Instead what the Court offered is something closer to a rational-
connection test. Writing for the Court, Maclntyre, J. said:
Where the pith and substance of the provincial enactment is in relation to
matters which fall within the field of provincial legislative competence,
incidental or consequential effects on extra-provincial rights will not
render the enactment ultra vires. Where, however, the pith and substance
of the provincial enactment is the derogation from or elimination of extra-
provincial rights then, even if it is cloaked in the proper constitutional
form, it will be ultra vires.01
This quotation does not tell us whether a given set of private rights is
extra- or intra-provincial. Maclntyre, J. proceeded on the assumption
that such rights could and should be assigned a locus, and thought that in
contract disputes two factors could assist in that task. One was the place
of performance. The Court thought that since the contract before it gave
Hydro-Quebec the right to receive delivery of power in that province,
that indicated the civil rights in dispute were located in Quebec.102
95. Though some judges have employed common-law choice-of-law rules to test for
compliance with s. 92(13): See the dissent of Laskin, C.J.C. in The Queen v. Thomas
Equipment [1979] 2 S.C.R. 529, 96 D.L.R. (3d) 1 and the singular judgment of Ritchie, J. in
Interprovincial Co-operatives v. The Queen, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 477; 53 D.L.R. (3d) 321.
96. Swan, supra, note 89 at 296-311.
97. [1913] A.C. 283; 9 D.L.R. 337; 3 W.W.R. 944 (P.C.).
98. [1939] A.C. 468; [1939] 3 D.L.R. 1; [1939] 2 W.W.R. 566 (P.C.).
99. [1979] 2 S.C.R. 529; 96 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
100. (1984), 8 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.).
101. Id, at 30.
102. Id, at 31.
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Secondly, the Court held that "ordinarily the rule is that rights under
contracts are situate in the province or country where the action may be
brought".103 In Churchill Falls both of these tests pointed to the same
jurisdiction, but that will not always be the case and the Court did not
inform us what the relationship between the tests might be."04 Clearly this
test will not enable us to deal effectively with issues arising under the
G.A.A. If the courts were to follow the interpretations sketched out
above and to endeavour to protect Albertans against foreign creditors
then (absent choice-of-forum clauses) the Churchill Falls test would hold
this extended application of the G.A.A. valid in most cases. The place of
performance would normally be Alberta for that would be the
guarantor's residence and likewise Alberta would be the place - though
often not the only place - where an action on the guarantee could be
brought.
Yet this is likely to be precisely the sort of case in which an interpretive
approach might test the constitutional limits of legislative power.
Williston Basin State Bank, for instance, posed the issue of an Alberta
resident leaving his home province and dealing face to face with
foreigners. And even if the facts in that case had demonstrated some
sufficient Alberta nexus for the transaction, we can easily imagine fact
situations in which Alberta's legislative capacity to protect wandering
residents might be called into serious question. What, for instance, would
we think of Alberta's ability to protect its "residents" who might spend
half a year in Florida and negotiate and complete an agreement of
suretyship there?
It is beyond the scope of this paper to sketch out a suggested judicial
standard for determining the territorial breadth of provincial legislative
competence. The Americans have been wrestling with the problem for
years without arriving at a satisfactory solution. In more recent times
some helpful preliminary suggestions have been offered by Canadian
scholars. 105 An interpretive approach would doubtless have the effect of
prompting this hitherto almost dormant constitutional beast to raise its
head. Given the problems the Americans have had here, one could
almost prefer the traditional jurisdiction-selecting analysis which at least
103. Id, at 31-2.
104. For a critique of the Supreme Court's reasons on this point see Edinger, Case Comment
(1983), 63 Can. Bar Rev. 203 at 212-13.
105. E. Edinger, Territorial Limitations on Provincial Powers (1982), 14 Ottawa L. Rev. 57
and J. Swan, supra, note 8. Relying on what in his view is the soundest of the American
approaches, Swan suggests that we could consider the constitutional capacity of a provincial
court to apply its own law by inquiring whether doing so would impair a predominant interest
of a sister province or violate a national interest (p. 309). This seems preferable to anything out
Supreme Court has come up with so far.
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has the advantage of letting sleeping dogs lie. But it can be no justification
for preferring one common law methodology to another that one has the
virtue of quietly violating constitutional boundaries that are likely to be
difficult to delineate.
VIII. Conclusion
I have (1) pointed out significant and unanswerable defects in current
Canadian choice-of-law methodology in contracts cases, (2) offered a
plausible alternative that could set us on the road to healthier conflicts
jurisprudence and (3) stated that therefore courts should take the earliest
possible opportunity to modify the existing law by adopting an
interpretive approach. It seems to me that the advantages I have
demonstrated here would be found in any contracts/conflicts case,
regardless of whether the competing substantive rules are statutory or
judge-made in origin.
Even while I assert this, however, I appreciate that change in this area
is slow and incremental and that, since the arguments in this paper are
not novel (only the example has been changed), it may be that I have
done little more than to indicate which side of a well-known and
somewhat arrested academic debate appeals to me. An interesting and
perhaps discouraging aspect of this debate is that little has been added
since John Willis, Walter Wheeler Cook and David Cavers took it up 50
years ago.106 I know from experience that I will have changed the minds
of no one in the jurisdiction-selecting camp. Indeed, in their eyes I have
will done little more than to rehearse routine arguments and demonstrate
yet again the folly of interpretive approaches. To such persons the defects
that I sought to minimize will appear enormous, and the cost of avoiding
them will seem well worth incurring the price of any flaws in the
jurisdiction-selecting system. My opening claim to have set the debate on
firmer empirical ground by examining all the reported decisions under a
given statute will only serve to make the case against interpretive
methodology all the more strong.
Why has there been so little progress in this debate? It may be that
whether one inclines to the jurisdiction-selecting or the interpretive camp
is less a matter of rational argument and proof than of psychological
predisposition. I think that Moffatt Hancock, a significant member of the
interpretivist school, was doing more than idle name-calling when he
labelled members of the jurisdiction-selecting school "rule fetishists". 107
106. See notes I and 8, supra
107. See: Some Choice-of-Law Problems Posed by Anti-Guest Statutes: Realism in Wisconsin
andRule-Fetishism in New York (1975), 27 Stan. L. Rev. 775.
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And we interpretivists may incline to be sloppy and sentimental
romantics, insufficiently appreciative of the need to control judicial
tyranny with clear, "bright-line" rules.
I have no wish, however, to conclude this debate by reducing it to a
crude, amateur-behaviouralist explanation. Whatever the reason for the
entrenched, predictable nature of the arguments on either side of the
issue, the tension between clear, rigid rules and flexible but imprecise
policies must be accommodated in other areas of the law and it can be
accommodated here.
There may in fact be areas of the conflict of laws where rules of the
jurisdiction-selecting sort have their place and where their claimed virtues
of certainty, predictability and neutrality truly operate. If, for instance, the
domestic substantive law of a given area is characterized by a
jurisprudence of strict, mechanical rules with little apparent need for
explicit appeal to principle, policy or instrumentalist arguments, it may be
that mechanical choice-of-law rules will do the job in such areas.
Certainly interpretive approaches to multi-state cases will be difficult
when the analogous domestic jurisprudence provides no clues as to the
policies of the competing rules.
I think, however, that jurisdiction-selecting approaches are likely to be
particularly inappropriate where, when we consult the purely domestic
application of the underlying rules, we find that courts have been
receptive to purposive arguments. Such decisions tell us that in those
cases judges have found in both necessary and possible to abandon
formalistic adjudication. In the domestic application of the G.A.A., for
instance, courts have managed to inquire into the policy of the statute.
They have found it useful to develop flexible standards. For instance, a
mere technical failure to comply will not invalidate a guarantee. On the
other hand the mere fact of compliance will not always be enough. The
following passage from a recent, non-conflicts G.A.A. decision shows
how courts are prepared to engage in particularized factual inquiries:
Section 4 of the Act dictates the purpose of the examination. There must
be an examination, although the extent of the examination may vary from
case to case, depending on the circumstances. What is critical is that the
extent of the examination is governed by the purpose of the examination,
and in any particular case, the notary must be satisfied that guarantor is
aware of the contents of the guarantee and understands it.
In some cases the examination might be most cursory and satisfy the
requirements of the Act. For example, I doubt a notary would need do
much to satisfy himself if the guarantor was a superior court judge or a
sophisticated businessman who had granted numerous guarantees in the
past.
On the other hand, the examination might require considerable caution
by the notary when the guarantor is someone he does not know and does
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not know that person's educational, business and other background. What
is being guaranteed may also affect the extent of the guarantee. 108
This indicates that, in the domestic context in which the statute must
operate, courts feel obliged to use flexible, particularistic standards to
determine its scope of operation. Those courts have indicated that they
felt it necessary, in order to reach acceptable results, to embark on
detailed factual inquiries. This being so in the purely domestic sphere,
when the statute must be construed in territorially complex cases it seems
unlikely that just results or consistent jurisprudence will be achieved by
tying the law's application to rigid, mechanical rules which permit no
inquiry into the sort of facts which relate to the Act's purpose. If an
interpretive approach is called for anywhere, it is called for here.
108. Economy Floor Coverings v. Anthony's Italian Restaurant Ina et al (1986), 42 Alta.
L.R. (2d) 361 (Q.B.) at 368-9.
